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The geophilosopher is one who philosophically 
experiences rather than flees the earth, who passes 
through by remaining with it. Geophilosophical 
experience entails facing, more and more deeply, 
the fact of earth as the place of philosophy, and 
more profoundly, experiencing earth as facticity 
itself, the site of thought’s passage to the absolute. 
Nicola Masciandaro, “Becoming Spice” 
Thinking takes place in the relationship of territory 
and the earth. 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
In Jules Verne’s Journey to the Center of the Earth, Professor 
Lidenbrock, after exploring the town of Grauben, forces his 
nephew up the narrow staircase of a church in order to induce 
vertigo. The professor tells him that they must take “abyss 
lessons,”1 in order to prepare themselves for their forthcoming 
descent into the planet. In the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
appropriation of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Professor Challen-
ger, what we require is the services of a geophilosopher (or 
1 Jules Verne, Journey to the Center of the Earth (New York: Bantam 
Classic, 2006), 42. 
2 introduction: abyss lessons 
geophysicist), possessed with the madness of Lidenbrock, in 
order to unground the earth in philosophical and folk 
thinking. 
 In far too much continental philosophy, the Earth is a 
cold dead place enlivened only by human thought—either as a 
thing to be exploited, or as an object of nostalgia. This split is 
endemic to philosophies of nature on the whole, a split 
diagnosed by Pierre Hadot as the divide between the Prome-
thean and Orphic tendencies in viewing nature. Furthermore, 
this divide not only presents a false choice between 
exploitative capitalist Cartesianism and neo-pagan Spinozism, 
but also wrongfully presupposes that nature is a thing 
ontologically separate from humanity. That is, both the 
Promethean and the Orphic tendencies assume that human 
beings are a priori set apart from nature, either due to divine 
entities (God, Soul, etc.) or to our purportedly unique 
cognitive abilities. 
 Setting aside religious arguments for the sake of realism 
and materialism (and brevity), the Earth has been used to 
ground thought instead of bending it; such grounding far too 
often gives too much supposedly immovable ground to 
thinking, leaving the planet as nothing but a stage for 
phenomenology, deconstruction, and other forms of anthro-
pocentric philosophy. Geophilosophy, to return to Deleuze 
and Guattari, is named as the invention of Nietzsche,2 and, as 
Masciandaro notes, after Nietzsche geo-philosophy devolves 
into a philosophy of place (topos),3 particularly in 
Heideggerian philosophy, as the earth is carved into dwellings, 
homes, and the open.4 
While there have been some attempts at showing how 
the earth-as-process is integral to humanity’s existence, such 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. 
Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 85. 
3 Nicola Masciandaro, “Becoming Spice: Commentary as Geophilo-
sophy,” COLLAPSE VI: Geo/Philosophy (January 2010): 33 [20–56]. 
4  Masciandaro, “Becoming Spice,” 34–35. 
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as Manuel De Landa’s discussion of Homo sapiens’ endo-
skeletons as mineral invasion,5 or Jane Bennett’s ecopolitics, 
the terrestrial globe on which we haplessly crawl begs for more 
philosophical attention, especially as the globe has contoured 
every aspect of our material, cultural, and noetic existence.  
This will be our task. 
5 Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (Cam-
bridge: Zone Books, 2000), 27. 

1:WORMED EARTHS, OR, ABYSSAL
UNGROUNDINGS AND TORSIONAL POROSITIES 
V 
Although solidus, or the ground, with its gravity, 
integrity and tyrannical wholeness is ultimately 
restrictive, the eradication of the ground also results 
in the rise of another hegemonic regime—the 
regime of death and destruction. . . . Ungrounding 
is involved with discovering or unearthing a 
chemically-degenerating underside to the ground. 
Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia 
The infrastructure of the terrestrial process inheres 
in the obstructive character of the earth, in its mere 
bulk as a momentary arrest of solar energy flow. 
Nick Land, Thirst for Annihilation 
1.1.  THE EARTH IS A LIVING ISLAND 
 In one of their many plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
subject the earth (in both meanings of the term—to affect and 
to subjugate), through the recapitulated figure of Professor 
Challenger, to pain. They torture our home planet to reveal its 
secrets, thereby solidifying their codification of the earth as a 
“who” and not an “it.” This harkens back to Aristotle’s 
tetrasomia or Kant’s image of nature as geosomatic, in which 
the earth becomes something corporeal that can be tied to the 
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rack and then stretched for her secrets. Our concern here is 
slightly different. As Iain Hamilton Grant points out in 
Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, Kant’s own soma-
tization of the earth operates via a crypto-Aristotelianism. For 
Aristotle, physics must always be a “science of the body.”6 As 
Grant points out in the closing chapters, Deleuze is complicit 
in this somaphilia, which reduces nature to a collection of 
objects, wherein the earth becomes a place or set of places, 
instead of a materially vital life/thought engine. 
 This is to say nothing of Husserl’s ark-ization of the 
earth (the earth as the “original ark,” where the Earth is flung 
back in time to its pre-Copernican state as merely the bounds 
of experience), as over-romanticized ground (Boden), or of 
what Heidegger would call Offenheit, or openness, as Meleau-
Ponty shows.7 It is such images of Earth as both dead body 
and mute cradle that we set out to destroy with digging 
machines, massive energy weapons, and total ecological 
collapse. These images perform a dual criminal function: one, 
to stabilize thinking, and two, to give gravity to anthro-
pocentric thinking and being. 
The earth-anchoring of thought has a long tradition. In 
his study of Bataille, Nick Land writes, “A dark fluidity at the 
roots of our nature rebels against the security of terra firma, 
provoking a wave of anxiety in which we are submerged.”8 
Through the oceanic metaphor Land demonstrates how the 
auto-binding of thought to Earth caricatures both. This 
oceanic thinking leads us to the image of the island (which 
functions as a liminal point between the terrestrial and the 
aquatic), a common element in philosophical texts. The island 
stretches from Ibn Tufayl’s Philosophus Autodidactus, to 
6 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (Lon-
don: Continuum, 2006), 31. 
7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the College de 
France (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 77. 
8 Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent 
Nihilism (London: Routledge, 1992), 107. 




Plato’s Atlantis, to Bacon’s Atlantis, to Kant’s island of truth 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, all the way to Deleuze’s desert 
islands. Outside philosophical texts, one hardly need mention 
the television series Lost and its population of characters 
named after philosophers. 
 Lost is just one of the more recent examples of the long 
metaphoric use of islands, a use which Milan Cirkovic 
explores, in his essay “Sailing the Archipelago”: 
 
We live on a small island. We have not yet ventured 
much beyond our immediate locale on this small 
island; even our own inconspicuous location still 
holds great mysteries for us. It seems that we find 
ourselves near the mountain peak of our island, but 
even that is uncertain. We have only recently 
discovered that there are other islands besides our 
home scattered in a vast (possibly infinite) ocean. 
And the ocean is dead.”9 
 
The idea of the earth as an island reinforces the fact that 
the earth is not bounded in a well-defined way, nor is it 
immune to the rages of the ocean and other forces—radiation, 
cosmic rays, meteorites and so on. Cirkovic defines an island 
as “a set of parameters describing habitable universes which 
are close in parameter space.”10 He thus denaturalizes the 
earth, making it a particular parameter of nature and not an 
automatically stable philosophical given.  
 Here we wish to subject the earth to pain—not as a 
somatized creature, but as a planet, the glob of baked matter 
that it is—in order to test its limitropic porosity and see how 
much ungrounding the earth can take before it ceases to be 
simultaneously an example of nature’s product and also its 
                                                                                  
9 Milan Cirkovic, “Sailing the Archipelago,” COLLAPSE V: The 
Copernican Imperative (February 2009): 293. 
10 Cirkovic, “Sailing the Archipelago,” 297. 
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productivity. The digging or ungrounding of the earth is often 
tied to thought, as the work of depth is a digging that occurs, 
to borrow Deleuze’s phrase, in the image of thought. For 
Deleuze, thought does all the digging: dynamism is contained 
within the idea.11 This is unfortunate given the following 
passage: 
There is necessarily something cruel in this birth of 
a world which is a chaosmos, in these worlds of 
movements without subjects, roles without actors. 
When Artaud spoke of the theater of cruelty, he 
defined it only in terms of an extreme ‘deter-
minism,’ that of spatio-temporal determination in 
so far as it incarnates an Idea of mind or nature. . . . 
Spaces are hollowed out, time is accelerated or 
decelerated, only at the cost of strains and 
displacements which mobilise and compromise the 
whole body.12 
Again, the specter of somatization returns. Furthermore, 
Deleuze’s virtualization of the idea guarantees a pre-
thinkability of nature in-itself: a necessary move given 
Deleuze’s denial of transcendence and his valorization of the 
univocity of being, or singular ontology.13 
 Against such somatization and over-ideation of nature 
and the Earth, Iain Hamilton Grant argues that the dyad of 
producer and produced disappears via the cosmic striations of 
matter over time, and yet, the retroactive recognition of 
mammalian perception digs objects out of the flatness of time 
as if they were static, thereby orienting them to our attempts 
to make sense of time, a time-for-us. One must, against 
correlationist doxa (where the universe is only understood in 
11 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 218–219. 
12 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 219. 
13 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 35. 




relation to human frames of perception) take the weight of the 
cosmic cascade into the pulsations of everyday life as 
saturating the seen and unseen. This requires a certain 
inaccessibility regarding the materiality/reality of existence 
(thereby shattering any all-encompassing univocity/imma-
nence) as well as a redefinition of the transcendental to 
appease such inaccessibility. This task is assisted by differen-
tiating Deleuze’s use of ground from Schelling’s, through the 
transmogrification of the transcendental. 
As Grant indicates, Schelling’s ground and process of 
ungrounding moves against the Kantian/Fichtean privileging 
of world over earth.14 While it would seem that Deleuze 
combats this move, his thinkable (inter-ideal) differentiation-
as-transcendence departs significantly from Schelling. Grant 
writes: “the nature of the Schellingian transcendental is, as we 
have seen, as different from the Deleuzian as from the 
Kantian: the earth itself, as a productive product, is to that 
extent a natural transcendental or a Scheinprodukt.”15 Where 




1.2. SCHELLING’S UNGROUND 
 
Grant’s resuscitation of Schelling’s transcendental geology 
functions to realize Schelling’s ground by developing a realism 
(i.e., Schelling’s idealism remains qualified by nature), where-
as by contrast, “Deleuze maintains the antithesis of nature and 
freedom, and thus does not determine the one by the other . . . 
at the cost of regionalizing matter with respect to ideation.”17 
As Grant continues, this line of thinking brings Deleuze close 
to his nemesis Hegel, in that both seem to deny how geology 
                                                                                  
14 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 199–200. 
15 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 201. 
16 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 165. 
17 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 202. 
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could affect thought.18 
The transcendental geology of Schelling not only rede-
fines the transcendental as the capacity for the unknown to 
seize thought, and to produce thought and thought’s necessary 
material ground, but also redefines the temporal quality of all 
actualization.19 The central concern for Grant in regards to 
Schellingian anteriority is what he calls powers—a concern 
that Deleuze recognizes but then seems to forget.20 The 
importance of a powers-ontology lies in the fact that any 
object cannot contain its own conditions for coming to be that 
object, whether that object be an idea, a terrestrial sphere, or a 
perforation of that sphere. Hegel’s world of eternal becoming, 
like Deleuze’s world-as-egg, denies actuality its temporality—
hence Hegel's and Deleuze’s rejection of realist geology.21 
Grant summarizes the importance of such a geology in 
the following way: 
If geology, or the ‘mining process,’ opens onto an 
ungroundedness at the core of any object, this is 
precisely because there is no ‘primal layer of the 
world’, no ‘ultimate substrate’ or substance on 
which everything ultimately rests. The lines of serial 
dependency, stratum upon stratum, that geology 
uncovers do not rest on anything at all, but are the 
records of actions antecedent in the production of 
consequents.22  
The mechanics of ungrounding, however, cannot be 
reduced to anteriority in either its physical or ideal forms. If 
18Iain Hamilton Grant, “Mining Conditions,” in The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick 
Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2010), 41–46. 
19Grant, “Mining Conditions,” 44. 
20Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 190. 
21 See Grant, “Mining Conditions.” 
22Grant, “Mining Conditions,” 44. 




we hold to a powers-ontology, then the process of grounding 
and ungrounding must be articulated in the most base 
articulation of powers, that of spatio-temporality. This spatio-
temporality is a simultaneous ungrounding/grounding and 
interiorizing/exteriorizing. As Ray Brassier notes in his text 
“Concepts and Objects,” such dualities are not outmoded 
metaphysical baggage, but are necessary, especially given the 
troubling indistinction of ontology and epistemology once 
anthropocentric veils have been torn.23 
While Schelling is easily the master of grounding and 
ungrounding, we will have to look elsewhere to develop a 
theory of interiority/exteriority and the relation of the two 
terms to one another. Michael Vater points out that 
Schelling’s utilization of temporality as the individuating 
factor in his identity philosophy leads to an opposition of the 
internal and external that is far too simplistic.24 However, this 
claim denies the naturephilosophical concerns of Schelling, 
according to which the real is connected with externality, 
while this externality is separated from the internality of the 
mind only formally and not qualitatively. Schelling’s philo-
sophy has frequently been disregarded as a step towards 
Hegel, as failing to extend or transform Kant in the degree 
which Fichte and Hegel did—the former exacerbating the ego 
to an extreme positivity, the latter intensifying the I in a 
negative sense in order to overcome the being/knowing 
balancing act of Kant. To see Schelling in this way is to see 
him as far more Kantian than he is. Schelling, then, must be 
thoroughly spatialized. In one of Grant’s many Schellingian 
adventures, he comments on the disregard of interiority when 
it comes to temporal expansion.25 
                                                                                  
23Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” in The Speculative Turn, eds. 
Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman, 47–65. 
24F.W.J. Schelling, Bruno, or, On the Natural and Divine Principle of 
Things, trans. Michael G. Vater (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1984), 76, 78. 
25Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin 
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Interiority becomes problematic from a point of view of 
realism, as it cannot merely be a temporal distinction; 
temporal distance cannot determine the reality of objects, of 
their inaccessibility. That is, time alone cannot explain the 
layering of the world; there must be a materiality which is not 
merely formal. Space suffers a similar problem (perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the logical interdependence of time and 
space) as, at its deepest ground, it blurs the distinction be-
tween base materiality and pure formalism. Or, in other 
words, space cannot be taken as merely the stage of matter.26 It 
is a quality of gravity27 that controls the motion of matter and 
is warped by matter in kind.28 This brings us back to 
Schelling’s powers and how the interaction of powers can be 
called a materialism, materiality, or perhaps, realism. 
1.3. EXAGGERATED DECAY 
Two theorists will aid us in the project of a realist and 
truculent theory of space-time as non-formal and generative: 
Reza Negarestani and Martin Hägglund. 
 Reza Negarestani further destructs the Deleuzo-
Guattarian terrestrial determination by investigating the 
poromechanics of the Earth: the vital but non-vital work of 
decay, hollowing out life, where “[t]he cosmogenesis of decay 
unfolds within solidity, [and] spreads from interior to outer 
surfaces.”29 These intrinsic temporal dimensions are brought 
out explicitly in Negarestani’s “Memento Tabere: Reflections 
Meillassoux, “Speculative Realism,” COLLAPSE III: Unknown 
Deleuze [+ Speculative Realism] (November 2007): 338–339 [307–
449]. 
26Sten F. Odenwald, Patterns in the Void: Why Nothing is Important 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 7. 
27Oldenwald, Patterns in the Void, 109. 
28Oldenwald, Patterns in the Void, 138. 
29Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 181–182. 




on Time and Putrefaction”: 
 
We can say that in decay space is perforated by 
time: Although time hollows out space, it is space 
that gives time a twist that abnegates the privilege 
of time over space and expresses the irrepressible 
contingencies of the absolute time through material 
and formal means.30 
 
Negarestani’s rot-thought likewise sets up an important 
relation of the interior and the exterior in both ontological and 
epistemological concerns. 
This is not to ignore the spatial dimensions of decay, 
where “dimensions and metrons deteriorate beneath the 
machinery of rot”31 non-metrically, disintegrating objects in a 
non-fragmentary way.32 Proceeding in an ostensibly anti-
Deleuzian fashion, Negarestani notes: “Chemistry starts from 
within, but its existence is registered on the surface; ontology 
is, so to speak, merely a superficial symptom of chemistry.”33 
Understanding the acidity of space-time against the soft 
infirmity of matter is paramount for any realist articulation of 
geophilosophy. Or as Grant puts it, geology is the corpse 
grinder of the earth.34 
Furthermore, in his unpublished essay “Triebkrieg,” 
Negarestani discusses the two traumas of the earth in relation 
to internality and externality. He writes: 
                                                                                  
30Reza Negarestani, “Memento Tabere: Reflections on Time and 
Putrefaction,” http://blog.urbanomic.com/cyclon/archives/2009/03/ 
memento_tabi_re.html. 
31Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 186. 
32Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 187. 
33Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 187. 
34Iain Hamilton Grant, “At the Mountains of Madness: The Demon-
ology of the New Earth and the Politics of Becoming,” in Deleuze and 
Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 96. 
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If geophilosophy is a philosophy that grasps 
thought in relation to earth and territory, then it is 
a philosophy that, perhaps unconsciously, grasps 
thought in relation to two traumas, one precipitated 
by the accretion of the earth and the other ensued 
by the determination of the territory. Whilst the 
former trauma lies in the consolidation of the earth 
as a planetary ark for terrestrial life against the 
cosmic backdrop, the latter is brought about by a 
combined geographic and demographic determi-
nation of a territory against the exteriority of the 
terrestrial plane and fluxes of populations of all 
kinds.35 
It is the former trauma with which this text is concerned. 
Against Heideggerian and Agambenian fascinations with the 
open, homeness, and so forth, Negarestani does not subject 
place or topos beneath a phenomenal sensibility or sense of 
being, but instead notes the tensions between lifeforms (not 
forms-of-life) and territories—territories as hunks of matter 
and biological and socio-political demarcations.  
 If Negarestani’s texts pull out the dark spatial ramify-
cations of a realist geophilosophy, then Martin Hägglund’s 
philosophy can be taken as a temporal addendum to 
Negarestani’s twisted space. Hägglund’s highly innovative 
reading of Derrida’s work, elaborated in Radical Atheism and 
subsequent projects, develops a fascinating articulation of 
time and space’s relationship. Hägglund argues that time is 
ultratranscendental36 and must be, first and foremost, a logic 
of succession and not a category of thought that is 
(phenomenologically) obsessed with the present.37 Time must 
be spatialized or thought in terms of the becoming-time of 
35Reza Negarestani, “Triebkrieg” (unpublished manuscript), 5. 
36Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 10. 
37Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 15–16. 




space,38 where space is what remains after temporal succes-
sion. Hägglund further argues that the time of survival is the 
very is-ness of life.39  
The thrust of Hägglund’s argument runs against the 
psychoanalytic bastion of the death drive, for Hägglund 
suggests that life means survival and not, as Freud suggested, 
an irrational drive beyond desire which may or may not result 
in self-destruction. Hägglund’s use of time rallies against 
philosophical uses of immortality. He speaks of Derrida’s 
mortal germ as something “inseparable from the seed of life,” 
writing,  
 
To think the trace as an ultratranscendental con-
dition is thus to think a constitutive finitude that is 
absolutely without exception. From within its very 
constitution life is threatened by death, memory is 
threatened by forgetting, identity is threatened by 
alterity, and so on.40 
 
Or, following Land’s reading of Freud, life itself becomes 
merely a labyrinthine route toward death.41 
 Time and space are each the trace of the other leaving 
behind materiality, a materiality which confirms the mortality 
of both the living and the non-living as well as the increasing 
difficulty in separating the two, given the violent force of 
succession. How and if succession can be separated from 
decay becomes a complex problem.42 This complexity arises 
not only from the function of decay but also from the massive 
knot of epistemology and ontology and their subsequent 
                                                                                  
38Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 18. 
39Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 33–34. 
40Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 19. 
41Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 47. 
42On the relation of succession and anthropocentricity, see Julian 
Barbour’s The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Physics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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indistinction. As Land writes, 
This coherence of existent knowing has always been 
taken by philosophy to be the evident principle of 
ontology, or the harmonious reciprocity of 
knowing/being. From Plato, through the Scholas-
tics, to Descartes and beyond, thought presupposes 
and confirms existence, just as existence bears 
witness to its origin in divine ideation. . . . Only an 
immortal entity is able to reflectively apprehend 
pure being, without becoming inevitably lost in the 
swamp of matter; that dangerous compacted mass 
of being and annihilation, malignantly meta-
phoric, infectious, gnawed, and rotten with time.43 
This onto-epistemological indistinction is of course only an 
indistinction from the point of view of thinking beings, 
whereas the collusion of decay and process is deeply meta-
physical. Again, Land is the most useful touchstone here: 
As the destroyer the universe is time, and as the 
destroyed nature, but in the destruction nature 
sloughs off the crust in which it had petrified itself 
and infests time like rot, regressing to its molten 
core; base matter, becoming, flow, energy, imma-
nence, continuity, flame, desire, death.44 
As Land reiterates through his text, reason and its material 
manifestations (civilization, religion, etc.) only serve as a poor 
salve to this wound. The trauma between process and decay 
becomes one of the limits of thinking, of the madness of 
reason. 
It is impressive that Negarestani manages to short circuit 
43Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 81. 
44Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 96. 




the madness of reason and thinking of rot-as-process. Rot 
cannot be seen as merely the undermining of bodies, as only a 
negative undoing completely separate from the formative 
processes of nature, as seen above in the quotation from Land. 
In his essay “Undercover Softness: An Introduction to 
the Architecture and Politics of Decay,” Negarestani engages 
medieval theorists of rot to explore the somatically nullifying 
mathesis of their philosophies. As Negarestani confirms, “the 
troubling aspect of decay has to do more with its dynamism or 
gradation than with its inherently defiling nature.”45 He 
continues: 
 
Decay does not result in the equivocation between 
putrid and wholesome; it rather constructs both 
ideas as its gradationally proper forms, so that what 
is considered wholesome can in fact be seen as a 
rotten derivative of an initial construction that has 
limitropically diminished.46 
 
The most interesting thrust of Negarestani’s piece is the 
relation between exteriors and interiors inaugurated by decay: 
“To put it simply, decay is a process that exteriorizes all 
interiorities via their own formal or ideal resources.”47 
Further, decay builds towards the exterior via the formation of 
nested interiorities.48 These interiorities, once taken into 
thought, are traumas—with trauma here understood as 
interiorized exteriority. While the psyche attempts to nest 
(back in the earth) the exterior barrage of nature’s succession, 
in the end (since thought itself is an outgrowth of nature), the 
nested traumas only open the thinking individual up to 
                                                                                  
45Reza Negarestani, “Undercover Softness: An Introduction to the 
Architecture and Politics of Decay,” COLLAPSE VI:  Geo/Philosophy 
(January 2010): 382 [379–430]. 
46Negarestani, “Undercover Softness,” 383. 
47Negarestani, “Undercover Softness,” 385. 
48Negarestani, “Undercover Softness,” 386. 
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further ungroundings and regroundings. 
 These traumas plant instabilities within the earth and 
initiate the internal ungroundings we will explicate. To engage 
a complex matrix of ungroundings and groundings means to 
build, or at least start to articulate, a metaphysics that escapes 
both the somaphilia of Kant, in which collections of bodies are 
woven via consciousness, as well as any vitalism (whether 
classical or modern) in which the substantiality of matter is 
given too little attention. 
Exaggerating decay means both pushing it to the smallest 
extremes—as perforating particle, the micro-meteorite which 
punctures the hull, the small projectile of rail gun (fictional 
and factual), and the thrown-about atomic ammunition of 
particle accelerators—and also to the largest degree, in the 
destruction of massive bodies based on machinic and 
cosmological ruptures. 
The first task is to construct, through somewhat strange 
means, a theory of ungrounding, both internally and exter-
nally. A realist theory of ungrounding, following Negarestani, 
must engage with decay, with the intensive interaction 
between forces and bodies, without allowing either to abject or 
exterminate the other. 
1.4. WORMS, OR INTERNAL UNGROUNDING 
Internal ungroundings function on various scales. The small 
function of decay of the tiny earthworm (within the carcass or 
the soft soil) meets the colossal destruction of the worm in the 
manifestations of speculative literature, films, and video-
games. With the Riftworm (from Gears of War), the Antlions 
(Half Life 2), the sand-worms of Dune, the graboids from 
Tremors, the cytidic Mongolian death worm, Edgar Allen 
Poe’s Conqueror Worm, as well as H.P. Lovecraft’s and Tho-
mas Ligotti’s various horrific utilizations of worms both large 
and small, the worm has enjoyed—and continues to enjoy—a 




lively speculative life. To 
get a strong grasp of the 
oddness of internal un-
grounding, it will be 
helpful to pass through 
the lairs of the worms. 
Poe’s Conqueror 
Worm is the least literal 
and is generally viewed as 
a representation of inevi-
table death, as that which 
gobbles up masked an-
gels. But still, the worm 
carries all the weight of 
death and decay, invok-
ing the giant dragon-like 
worms of medieval maps. 
 
 Out—out are the lights—out all!  
     And, over each quivering form,  
The curtain, a funeral pall,  
     Comes down with the rush of a storm,  
While the angels, all pallid and wan,  
     Uprising, unveiling, affirm  
That the play is the tragedy, ‘Man,’  
     And its hero the Conqueror Worm.49  
 
The giant worms of Frank Herbert’s Dune are the most well-
known worms in science fiction. They are enormous creatures 
that churn the sands of the planet of Arrakis, and are 
worshipped by its inhabitants (the Freemen) as Shai-Hulud, or 
“the old man of the desert.” The crystalline-toothed gargan-
                                                                                  
49Edgar Allan Poe, “The Conqueror Worm,” Wikisource: http://en. 
wikisource.org/wiki/The_Conqueror_Worm. See also The Complete 
Works of Edgar Allan Poe: Vol. VII: Poems, ed. James Albert Harrison 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1902), 87–88. 
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tuan worms are driven mad by electrical fields and produce a 
physiology-altering drug known as melange as they move 
through the ground. The Freemen use the worms to traverse 
the desert planet and harvest their teeth as daggers. The 
sandworms are hundreds of meters long and appear as a mix 
between an earthworm and a sea worm. They have a peculiar 
relation to their planet, in that, as spawn, or sandtrout, the 
creatures quartered off all water on their world, turning the 
sphere into a massive desert. 
Besides ungrounding the interior of the earth as 
common worms do, the sandworms of Dune unground the 
surface of the planet by reducing the planet’s biomass almost 
to nothing. The worms participate in the organic/inorganic 
blur, as well as in the indistinction of madness and reason as a 
byproduct of their movement, especially in the production of 
a spice that has drastically mind-altering effects on the 
humanoids. 
 The worms of Dune have inspired other invertebrate 
science fiction horrors. In the military science fiction video-
game Gears of War, for instance, the depths of the planet Sera 
are rife with various worms. The largest of these is the rift 
worm, which is worshiped by the game’s antagonists, the 
Locust Horde. The Locust use the rift worm to sink the cities 
of man as humans have invaded their underground space (the 
Hollows) in search of Imulsion, a highly sought-after fluid 
that can be converted into energy. The planet and its worms 
from Gears of War are less interesting than those of Dune, but 
nonetheless hold an ecological lesson: the outer hollows were 
used as a dumping ground by humans before the Locust 
Horde made their way to the surface to begin their genocidal 
campaign. 
The other significant fictional giant worms are the 
graboids of the Tremors film franchise and the Mongolian 
death worm on which they are based. The Mongolian death 
worm, according to local accounts, resembles a giant cow 
intestine and is capable of spitting acid and gener-ating 




electricity. The graboids of 
Tremors, which are also 
called sand dragons, are in 
many ways smaller ver-
sions of the worms of 
Dune. In addition to 
worms as larger, more eco-
logically complex versions 
of their real world selves 
and as agents of death, 
worms are also engines of 
a terrestrial weirdness. 
 Weird fiction, and 
particularly the work of 
H.P. Lovecraft, entertains 
the strangeness of worms. 
“What the Moon Brings” is 
filled with brief musing on odd sea worms. Most disturbing 
are the worm-people found in Lovecraft’s “The Festival,” but 
also in Robert Howard’s “Worms of the Earth” and Thomas 
Ligotti’s “Last Feast of the Harlequin.” In “The Festival,” 
Lovecraft fictionalizes the Danish physician Ole Worm as a 
translator of the mad Arab Abdul Alhazred’s forbidden 
grimoire, the Necronomicon, citing the following unsettling 
passage: 
 
“The nethermost caverns,” wrote the mad Arab, 
“are not for the fathoming of eyes that see; for their 
marvels are strange and terrific. Cursed the ground 
where dead thoughts live new and oddly bodied, 
and evil the mind that is held by no head. Wisely 
did Ibn Schacabao say, that happy is the tomb 
where no wizard hath lain, and happy the town at 
night whose wizards are all ashes. For it is of old 
rumour that the soul of the devil-bought hastes not 
from his charnel clay, but fats and instructs the very 
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worm that gnaws; till out of corruption horrid life 
springs, and the dull scavengers of earth wax crafty 
to vex it and swell monstrous to plague it. Great 
holes secretly are digged where earth’s pores ought 
to suffice, and things have learnt to walk that ought 
to crawl.”50 
Negarestani situates the above passage as an outline of 
Lovecraftian poromechanics, which allow for the emergence of 
the Outside from within the Inside.51 The earth as a worm-
infested body illustrates the structural twist of the operation of 
nemat-space, in that the void does not merely unground the 
earth into oblivion. Indeed, such envoiding is necessary for 
the very possibility of architecture.52 The best geophysical 
detail of Lovecraft’s “The Festival” is the “oily underground 
river,” which is described as “that putrescent juice of earth’s 
inner horrors.”53 
It is important to note the difference in the use of the 
worm: for Lovecraft the worm is about the possible and 
terrifying transmutations of the human, whereas for Negares-
tani the worm and worming indexes a more disturbing and 
twisted aspect to nonhuman life-in-itself.54 Ligotti revisits the 
strange worm cult in “The Last Feast of the Harlequin,” in 
which an academic becomes one of the worm-like people who 
gather in the depths of the earth. Ungrounding and sub-
humanity are also found in The Descent, both Jeff Long’s novel 
and Neil Marshall’s unrelated horror film of the same name. 
Underground human life often leads to demonology. In 
Long’s novel, a race of cannibalistic human-like creatures are 
50H.P. Lovecraft, “The Festival,” in The Fiction: Complete and 
Unabridged, ed. S.T. Joshi (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2008), 262–
269. 
51Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 44. 
52Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 45–47. 
53Lovecraft, “The Festival,” 268. 
54I owe this point to Nicola Masciandaro. 




discovered living under the earth, suggesting the possibility of 
a historical Satan (which we will explore later). 
We can also consider the Shoggoths, the amorphous 
biological digging machines from Lovecraft’s novella At the 
Mountains of Madness, which were engineered by the “Great 
Old Ones” as slaves (living machines). Lovecraft describes 
them this way: 
 
It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any 
subway train—a shapeless congeries of proto-
plasmic bubbles, faintly self-luminous, and with 
myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-
forming as pustules of greenish light all over the 
tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, 
crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over 
the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so 
evilly free of all litter.55 
 
At the Mountains of Madness is a masterpiece of weird fiction 
that repeatedly invokes notions of deep time as two resear-
chers explore an ancient city built by the Shoggoths for the 
Great Old Ones. The Great Old Ones existed on the earth 
aeons before the rise of humanity from the slime pits, and it is 
suggested that the creation of human life on the earth might 
be a result of the Great Old Ones’ failed experiments in bio-
engineering. Land explores the possibility of Shoggothic 
Materialism through the invented figure of Hank Hack-
hammer. While it is unclear what such a materialism would 
be, the Shoggoths can easily be tied to the oddness of 
underground construction and internal ungrounding. Again, 
from At the Mountains of Madness: 
 
                                                                                  
55H.P. Lovecraft, At the Mountains of Madness, in The Fiction: 
Complete and Unabridged, ed. S.T. Joshi (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 2008), 802. 
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For this place could be no ordinary city. It must 
have formed the primary nucleus and center of 
some archaic and unbelievable chapter of earth’s 
history whose outward ramifications, recalled only 
dimly in the most obscure and distorted myths, had 
vanished utterly amidst the chaos of terrene 
convulsions long before any human race we know 
had shambled out of apedom. Here sprawled a 
Palaeogaean megalopolis compared with which the 
fabled Atlantis and Lemuria, Commoriom and 
Uzuldaroum, and Olathoc in the land of Lomar, are 
recent things of today—not even of yesterday; a 
megalopolis ranking with such whispered pre-
human blasphemies as Valusia, R’lyeh, Ib in the 
land of Mnar, and the Nameless city of Arabia 
Deserta.56 
 The apparent massiveness of this megalopolis is elided in 
the surface of a flat horizon, yet at the same time, it becomes 
big enough that it can serve as a stage for all living things. The 
actions of the Shoggoths and their wormy compatriots 
demonstrates life as an ungrounding force that essentially 
porositizes the earth—an exaggeration of the lowly earthworm 
that aerates the soil with its piston-like movement and 
restructures the soil for better drainage of water. The part of 
the earth influenced by the activities and biological residue of 
earthworms is appropriately called the drilosphere. 
This Shoggothic, or perhaps vermicular materialism, that 
we have articulated in the above few pages is intended to 
emphasize that the organic and inorganic co-conspire to 
unground, and that it does not take much to realize that one 
cannot merely slap on peasant shoes and stroll across the open 
as if the ground beneath one’s feet were stable. In addition to 
the fact that the ground crawls with life both on and beneath 
56Lovecraft, “At the Mountains of Madness,” 759. 




its thoroughly porositized surface, the matter of the shoes 
themselves, strange artifice that they are, are always already 
defamiliarized. 
Ligotti’s indirect response to Heidegger’s “The Origin of 
the Work of Art” can be seen in the following: 
 
The most everyday objects may turn peculiar and 
uncanny if we focus on them long enough, as if they 
were functionless lumps of matter-questionable and 
alien. Some old shoes in a clothes closet catch your 
eye and appear as shapes you have never before 
pondered. Soon you are not as at ease with them as 
you once were. . . . You select a pair of shoes to 
wear and sit down to put them on. It is then you 
notice your stockinged feet . . . and the body to 
which they are connected . . . and the universe in 
which that body is roving about with so many 
peculiar and uncanny things.57  
 
Ligotti ruthlessly opens humans to the exterior, not an exterior 
that is romantically exteriorized from the human brain itself, 
but, following Negarestani’s rot-thought, one that is coiled up 
and nestled in the softest parts of our brain. It is for these 
reasons that Ligotti argues that horror is more real than we 
are. 
It is therefore also horrific that we are capable of creating 
and utilizing tools that go even further in ungrounding, or 
even degrounding, that very place (the earth) on which our 
feet happen to be more or less planted. That is, the human 
capacity to carve and dig into the earth points to the oddness 
of how created objects themselves have little solid ground—
and yet they are capable of the eradication of the very surface 
of the earth. 
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Design an extraordinary machine which is for 
killing that which exists so that which does not exist 
may be complete.  
Louis Aragon, A Wave of Dreams 
 
We have gone even further and destroyed the land 
behind us! 
Nietzsche, The Gay Science  
 
 




Science fiction frequently utilizes the spatial torsion of the tiny 
and the large. This is epitomized by the shot early in J.J. 
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Abrams’ Star Trek (2009), where the villain Nero’s ship the 
Narrada (exiting from a churning singularity) confronts the 
USS Kelvin, with the former’s massive bulk reducing the latter 
to a speck—the difference between a watermelon and a kernel 
of corn. The divide between the immense and the miniscule 
simultaneously suggests the ridiculous insignificance of the 
assault (because of the enemy’s pure massiveness), and also 
the potential explosion of the immense by the unpredictable 
power of the small (akin to the destructive particle or the 
viciousness of the microbe). In its perfection, the destructive 
minuscule approaches a kind of pure perforating monad—
that which breaks through the hardest of objects (representing 
the supposed obdurate purity of the individuated thing)—as 
the tiny gets closer to the flow of pure space-time. This bears a 
political dimension, as much of science fiction involves 
rebellion against an oppressive empire. The opening scenes of 
both Star Wars: A New Hope (1977) and The Empire Strikes 
Back (1980) invoke both the division between the immense 
and the miniscule as well as differing relations of the empire to 
the rebellion in terms of spatial torsion. In the first scene of A 
New Hope, a massive sheet of detailed metal passes by to 
reveal a gaping hole (a docking bay) attempting to swallow the 
comparatively small rebel ship. That is, the technological 
massiveness of the empire attempts to overrun the smaller 
entity. In the second film, in a seemingly more intelligent (or 
perhaps desperate) act, the same massive ship releases a 
swarm of probes in order to find the rebels out in the vastness 
of space. In terms of technique, the ship mimics the shift from 
direct war to network-centric tactics in the world at large. We 
will return to network war and the war machine below. 
Of course, the striking visuals of the spatial torsion only 
re-emphasize the unpredictability of a materiality made of 
powers and flows and not objects, or at least not objects that 
are anything more than temporary arrests or slowings-down 
of those powers. But this cannot lead one uncritically to a 
romanticism, simply repeating the triumphant spirit of 




utopian science fiction in terms of destabilizing the galactic 
asymmetry. Joss Whedon’s space-western film Serenity (2009) 
plays with this image both politically and in the visual sense, 
when, once again, the massive fleet (or ship) is met by a far 
smaller and rebellious force. The ship, the Serenity, is soon 
followed by a mass of its own, not of allied ships but a cloud of 
vessels controlled by the Reavers—blood-crazed creatures who 
were the result of a failed experiment performed some years 
earlier by the alliance, and who are led into battle by a trick of 
the Serenity in a moment appropriately referred to by the 
captain of Serenity as “chickens come home to roost.” The 
visual torsion, then, is short-lived, and the political dimension 
is complicated, as the triumphant rebel fleet is not rebellious 
at all but is merely made up of mindless vengeance-seekers 




Tapping again into Negarestani’s rot-thought, we can 
take Whedon’s scene as a lesson against the pure power of the 
infinitesimal rebellion.58 It is helpful to quote Negarestani at 
length here: 
 
[T]he problem of infinitesimal persistence (becom-
ing infinitely close to zero but never effectively 
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becoming zero) poses yet another perplexing 
quandary in regard to the process of decay, a 
problem which can be summarized as follows: If the 
decaying object never completely disappears, and, 
in so far as it continues to become less, generates 
derivatives and maintains a germinal capacity, then 
does this mean that death never occurs and the 
minimally surviving object can never be fully 
exteriorized? An affirmative answer to this question 
surely risks advocating a form of vitalism that is 
ultimately unable to think exteriority. An outright 
negative answer can also lead to a form of utopian 
naivety.59 
Between the tiny rebellious ship and the massive monstrosity 
of empirical domination, or the unexpected free radical of 
decay and the pure externalized and unanchored war 
machine, the terrestrial globe appears as something of a 
tipping point or pivot between the most extreme magnitudes 
of science fiction. Negarestani circles such a possibility with 
his concepts of ( )hole complex and bacterial archeology. The 
glossary of Cyclonopedia defines the terms as follows: 
( )hole complex reinvents the Earth as a machine to 
speed the return of the Old Ones; its convolution 
irrevocably impairs the repressive Wholeness of the 
Earth. 
Bacterial Archeology. . . . Invigorating the germ-
infested chemistry of the Earth by turning it to 
( )hole complex; unearthing the planetary sphere as 
an irreducible complexity of reciprocal links 
between terrestrial epidemics and cosmic chemis-
59Negarestani, “Undercover Softness,” 387–388. 




tries or anonymous materials.60 
 
The science fictional always ends up back on the planet, 
for vessels only function as a temporary ground. Large 
machinic constructions function as a ground unto themselves 
as well, in many cases ungrounding the earth, participating in 
the Earth as ( )hole complex, through the unnatural holing of 
the earth through excavation. The immense/tiny distinction 
mentioned above can be represented, in both terrestrial and 
non-terrestrial realms, in the restless forms of the vortex, 
whirlpool, maelstrom, etc. 
The vortical is rampant in science fiction: black holes, 
spatio-temporal disturbances, singularities, warp gates, worm-
holes, etc. These anomalies give space a material constitution, 
likening it to an environment or ecosystem.  
After musing on cyclones, Nick Land writes: “A dark 
fluidity at the roots of our nature rebels against the security of 
terra firma.”61 Land goes on to note how reason acts as a salve 
against the fluidity of nature. The chapter where Land has this 
discussion is entitled “Fanged noumenon,” and, as the title 
implies, Land argues that noumena cannot be an episte-
mological limit but rather are an ontological fact. In other 
words, noumena are fanged because they do not remain 
harmlessly domesticated in the cage of Kantian categorization, 
but rather, damage and determine us and our thinking by 
their very nature. 
 Schelling’s philosophy, and in particular the early 
naturephilosophical stage of his work (Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie), holds the most useful articulation of the 
vortex in the image of the whirlpool. In the First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature, he writes: 
 
The chief problem of the philosophy of Nature is 
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61Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 107. 
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not to explain the active in Nature (for, because it is 
its first supposition, this is quite conceivable to it), 
but the resting, permanent. Nature philosophy 
arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of the 
presupposition that for Nature the permanent is a 
limitation of its own activity. So, if this is the case, 
then impetuous Nature will struggle against every 
limitation; thereby the points of inhibition of its 
activity in Nature will attain permanence.62 
Schelling then illustrates this in a footnote with the image of 
the whirlpool: 
a stream flows in a straight line forward as long as 
it encounters no resistance. Where there is 
resistance—a whirlpool forms. Every original 
product of nature is such a whirlpool, every organ-
ism. The whirlpool is not something immobilized, 
it is rather something constantly transforming—but 
reproduced anew at each moment. Thus no product 
in nature is fixed, but is introduced at each instant 
through the force of nature entire.63 
The tension that Schelling encircles is that of identity and 
process. The problem is: how is the whirlpool, or any product 
of nature, identified as such a product, given the tumultuous 
status of all objects? As Schelling emphasizes, “The product is 
originally nothing but a mere point, a mere limit, and it is only 
though Nature’s battling against this point that it is, so to 
speak, raised to a full sphere, a product.”64  
The most impressive and violent of whirlpools is the 
62F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of 
Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2004), 17–18. 
63Schelling, First Outline of a System, 18. 
64Schelling, First Outline of a System, 205–206. 




maelstrom, an extreme whirlpool which appears in Jules 
Verne’s 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, Edgar Allan Poe’s “A 
Descent into the Maelstrom,” and briefly in Herman Melville’s 
Moby-Dick. The mention in Moby-Dick is brief and is only to 
emphasize Ahab’s willingness to pursue the white whale to the 
ends of the earth, as the maelstrom mentioned is the Mosk-
straumen off the coast of Norway. Both Verne and Poe 
erroneously tie the maelstrom to the depths of the sea, when in 
fact it is a surface event created by cross-streams. 
Charybdis, the monster of Greek myth who spat out 
whirlpools and often appeared as a whirlpool, not only 
appears as an indeterminate object but as the edge of a 
disastrous object, as the space between Charybdis and Scylla 
(another watery monster), a space between two disasters, a 
space that is dominated by a lack of energy. The tension 
between the immense and the miniscule in the science fictive, 
mentioned above, resonates with the energetic poles of 
Charybdis and Scylla. Between the vortexes, vortexes that in 
themselves are objects with a minimal boundary, we have an 
expansion downwards and upwards, as well as side-to-side. 
This torrential spatiality is further complicated by the fact that 
whirlpools and vortexes are themselves conflicting forces in a 
particular medium, raising the question of the materiality of 
the whirlpool or the vortex. 
 The figure of the whirlpool explores what externality 
means in a material sense. Simply put, the vortex, the 
whirlpool, becomes the manifestation of the very process of 
externalizing on the surface, indexing the very concept of 
depths, both terrestrially and otherwise. That is, it shows the 
weirdness of spatial expansion within a particular medium. 
The question becomes one of the expansive movement of the 
whirlpool, whether the vortex expands at the top (towards 
immensity as a kind of grounding, in the Schellingian sense) 
or digs downwards towards its point, thereby ungrounding 
(towards the intense internality of the terminus). In order to 
explore the exaggerated yet minimalist materiality of the 
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vortex, we will double this exaggeration through odd, hyper-
bolic examples: digging machines and planet demolishers. 
2.2. DIGGING MACHINES 
The digging machine is a fundamentally cartoonish image, a 
completely unfeasible project. It is that which inhabits the 
vortical space—as opening the ground behind it, and forming 
a new ground in front of it as it digs. Most real digging 
machinery (particularly that used for mining) remains on the 
surface of the earth, destroying layers of surface with 
machinations, explosives, and chemicals, while sub-surface 
mining utilizes techniques of mazing already discussed in 1.3 
above (via the concept of Negarestani’s architectural decay). 
Surface machinery (such as that used with strip mining) often 
comprises fundamentally ridiculous constructions—certain 
excavators are among the largest land vehicles on Earth. The 
massiveness of these machines speaks to the bizarre extremes 
required to forge the digging machines that exist in 
speculative fiction. The digging machine is taken to a 
ridiculous extreme in the film The Core (2003). Negarestani 
aptly describes the film thus: 
The movie begins with scenes of a tellurian 
cataclysm: an electroconvulsive sky, disoriented 
animals, scrambled communication signals and 
agitated birds. The earth’s core has stopped 
spinning, and consequently the dynamism of all 
flows and convection currents at the core have been 
brought to an abrupt halt. . . . The movie depicts the 
last human attempts to reactivate the core and pre-
vent the Earth from becoming one with the Sun.65 
65 Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 161–162. 




The film’s protagonists, with endless funding from the US 
government, set about to bore into the earth in order to 
strategically place nuclear warheads at the core to recharge 
it—making the antagonist the Earth itself. The scientists 
construct a snake-like vehicle called the Virgil, powered by the 
fictional Unobtanium, and using lasers to carve through the 
Earth’s strata. The team encounters various problems, the first 
two relating to the unexpected hardness of the earth itself: a 
cavern of geodes and a pocket 
of diamonds. The team has to 
sacrifice segments of the 
Virgil in order to augment the 
nuclear explosions. One of 
the team members discovers 
that the slowing of the core 
was caused by the US govern-
ment using an experimental 
weapon that causes tactically 
useful earthquakes. Oddly, 
the film thus shows the 
merging of the Earth and the 
Sun as caused by a reground-
ing of the earth and stopped 
by the re-Sunning of the 
Earth—igniting its core. 
 Excavations that start 
from the surface are fairly 
common in fiction. Edgar 
Rice Burrough’s Pellucidar 
novels come to mind, and in particular At the Core of the 
Earth, which contains a drilling machine called the iron mole 
and the subterranean prospector. The series of novels explores 
the hollow Earth, as the iron mole takes the novel’s characters 
below the surface of the Earth to the interior’s surface. The 
world of Pellucidar is, like many regions in hollow Earth 
novels, a prehistoric one, where the vanquished species of the 
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Earth have migrated. Several novels involving terrestrial 
journeys reground the Earth’s interior, as the earth below us is 
made to be familiar, just like the surface we know. Verne’s 
Journey to the Center of the Earth is particularly disappointing 
in this regard, as the explorers find a fungal forest and a small 
ocean. 
The Technodrome of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles 
cartoons and videogames is, like Nero’s Narrada, a redoubled 
ungrounder. Not only does it dig beneath the earth, it also 
harbors a transdimensional portal. It is also one of the most 
bizarre digging machines, as it is doubles as a weapon of mass 
destruction. The Technodrome, with its arsenal of weapons 
and especially its transdimensional portal, is always situated in 
the best place to create collisions between the dark and 
volcanic dimension X with our world. 
The Technodrome, like the Narrada, redoubles 
ungrounding as both terrestrial digging and opening of 
portals that disregard spatial limitations. Subterranean digging 
machines, unlike the surface destroyers of the mining 




industry, not only unground and rework the earth, but also 
occupy the space that they dig out. The minimal safe distance 
of the excavators is completely lost in the work of the digging 
machine as the device carves its own open, blasting the 
contours of its own horizon.  
 External ungroundings not only unground, but also 
resurface and re-horizon the terrestrial space around them. 
The very concept of surface becomes nothing more substantial 
than the recent activity upon it. As Manuel De Landa writes, 
 
In terms of the nonlinear dynamics of our planet, 
the thin rocky crust on which we live and which we 
call our land and home is perhaps the earth’s least 
important component. The crust is, indeed, a mere 
hardening with the greater system of underground 
lava flows which, organizing themselves into large 
‘conveyor belts’ (convective cells), are the main 
factor in the genesis of the most salient and appa-
rently durable structures of the crusty surface.66 
 
This of course does not mean that humans are bound to exist 
on an open surface but can, and have, existed (at least to some 
degree) beneath the earth. Perhaps Zarathustra desired an 
escape underground as he himself lamented the surface of the 
earth: “The earth has a skin; and this skin has diseases and one 
of them is man.”67 He states that the sublime man’s happiness 
should “smell of the earth and not of contempt for the earth.”68 
Perhaps Zarathustra should have returned to his cave once the 
earth became too round for him.69 
For humans living in subterranean cities, digging 
machines would function as a device of ecological and archi-
                                                                                  
66De Landa, A Thousand Years, 257–258. 
67Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(London: Penguin Books, 2003), 153. 
68Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 140. 
69Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 284. 
38 external regroundings 
tectural expansion and less like a destructive entity. The 
function of machines in such a space is already required by the 
massive metropolises of the modern world: “[T]he toroidal 
world of self-intersecting drains and sewers built beneath 
developed cities all over the world . . . gives shape to the 
dominant mantra of modern architecture, that form follows 
function, with an intensity, and a necessity, that surface 
structures seldom achieve.”70 Furthermore, underground 
cities, such as those in Cappadocia, Turkey, will long outlast 
those on the planet’s storming surface.71 
To borrow from Deleuze and Guattari, a body (or 
assemblage of diggers in this case) can make itself into a war 
machine that interacts with the other nebulae of machines 
here—the other machinic assemblage being the stratified 
earth72—going about territorializing and deterritorializing the 
earth. Drug smugglers make themselves into a digging 
machine to circumvent US borders just as Bin Laden’s 
followers maze their way into the mountains to avoid 
detection.73 
 The fear of detection via ungrounding takes an extreme 
turn in the Matrix film trilogy. In the second and third Matrix 
films (The Matrix Reloaded and The Matrix Revolutions, both 
released in 2003), ungrounding is reversed, as it is humans 
who are usually the agents of ungrounding, moving towards 
the unknown of the earth. In the films, however, the 
antagonistic robotic life-forms, which control the earth’s 
surface, dig their way towards Zion (the last human city) while 
the humans huddle close to their geothermal heat, armed to 
the teeth. As the tentacled sentinels dig deeper and deeper, the 
humans unground themselves defensively, moving closer and 
closer to the heat engine of the Earth’s center. 
70 Geoff Manaugh, The BLDGBLOG Book (San Francisco: Chronicle 
Books, 2009), 53. 
71 Manaugh, The BLDGBLOG Book, 79. 
72 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 353. 
73 Manaugh, The BLDGBLOG Book, 84–85. 




 The ungrounding machines of the sentinels meet the 
ungrounding machine of the last humans of Zion, both of 
which are not concerned with surfaces but only with 
destroying each other, regardless of the charred earth between 
them. The possibility of a totalizing unleashing of machines, 
which is the cause of all the troubles in the Matrix series, 
brings us to the total planetary destruction of planet killers. 
 
 




To go even further in terms of external ungrounding and 
grounding, it is necessary to leave the earth’s surface entirely. 
Taking the ungrounding movement of the digging machines 
off the surface of the planet, the vortical, the whirlpool, and 
the storm become entities in themselves. Such manifestations 
occur in science fiction. 
The most well-known planet killer is no doubt Star Wars’ 
Death Star. The Death Star uses a powerful laser to obliterate 
planets that dare to defy the empire. The Death Star, through 
impossible energy expenditure, smooths out space since it is a 
war machine that replaces what it destroys, a sphere of 
complete militarization, though its weaknesses are quickly 
exploited and the machine is destroyed. Far more impressive 
planet killers exist in science fiction. 
The creature featured in the Star Trek: The Original Series 
episode, “The Doomsday Machine,” is the most literal actual-
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ization of the vortical, as it compacts planets and consumes 
the result—with its immensity at one end and its terminus at 
the other. This final point reconstitutes the consumed mass as 
a monad, a new perforating particle. The energetic funnel 
entity indexes the most central horror of actual space, that of a 
black hole. 
The black hole as a destructive singularity, as a center of 
gravity pushing the very fabric of space, is detached from its 
ultra-weight in the fantasy of planet destroying. Just as 
terrestrial digging machines worm their way through 
terrestrial bodies, deterritorialized digging machines (i.e., 
planet destroyers) move through space and expand the 
yawning spatiality of space itself. 
Internal ungrounding functions in terms of a meta-
physical darkening, whereas external ungrounding functions 
in terms of metaphysical blackening. These different modes 
can be likened to the cosmosis of decay articulated in Negares-
tani’s “Corpse Bride,” where he writes, “the intensive and 
extensive vectors of decay are imagined as a shriveling body 
from which a cosmic range of either beings emerge.”74 As a 
solid strike against somaticism, Negarestani suggests that for 
anything to remain, given the violent forces of decay, it must 
always remain less. As he puts it, “intensive diminution is 
reinforced by extensive subtraction.”75 
Different from worming, from darkening the interior 
which perforates and restructures the object, the planet killer 
blackens, removing the entire object to make space (in the 
cosmological bionome—the cosmonome, or, the capacity for 
the cosmos to bear life). The consuming vortex creates an even 
larger possibility for immensity in its clearing of the field as it 
spreads the very bounds of the field itself towards the 
boundless. 
74Reza Negarestani, “The Corpse Bride: Thinking with Nigredo,” 
COLLAPSE IV: Concept Horror (May 2008): 143 [129–161]. 
75Negarestani, “The Corpse Bride,” 144. 




Planet demolishing is an ungrounding apart from a 
ground, whereas worming regrounds. Worming is a kind of 
horizontal ungrounding, whereas planet demolishing will un-
ground the grounds, knock the very floor out from under it in 
a vertical way. Worming appears to be undoing what is 
beneath, what is under our feet. Worms dig, whereas the 
doomsday machines and planet killers obliterate horizontally. 
Planet killing, while apparently horizontal, is ontologically 
vertical, whereas worming is ontologically horizontal. This is 
contrary to the ungrounder’s actual movement, as worming 
horizontally opens up the stratification side to side, where 
digging machines and planet killers (as deterritorialized 
digging machines) devastate all chance of stratification, except 




Negarestani writes that, “Warmachines need an abun-
dant amount of metal to fuel their terminal multiplicity and 
their tactical anomalies. No metallic entity other than the 
Earth’s core can boast such riches for feeding warmachines 
with polygentic metals, electromagnetic anomalies (cyber 
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warmachines) and radical schizophrenia.”76 The planet killer 
as a deterritorialization of the war machine becomes perfected 
in the villain of Unicron from the Transformers (1986) 
animated film. Unicron is a techno-organic planet-sized entity 
which consumes other planets to propagate its existence. In 
this sense, Unicron, as the penultimate planet destroyer, is the 
perfect war machine as pure exteriority.77 While Deleuze and 
Guattari argue through the mouth of Clausewitz that the war 
machine is only ever improperly conducted by the State, 
Unicron is an entity the size of the largest entity known as 
even possibly governable.78  
As Manabrata Guha shows in his essay “Introduction to 
SIMADology,” the Clausewitzian paradigm of war is thought 
to be immune to even the strangest war machines, whether 
tiny or massive. But Guha argues that such thinking does not 
adequately grasp the complexity of battle space.79 Likewise, we 
attack—and will continue to attack—traditional geophilo-
sophy on the grounds that it believes it can contain indefinite 
worming (which can be likened to small explosions of havoc, 
which Guha names Singularly Intensive Mobile Agencity of 
Decay) and remain resistant to the Clausewitzian fantasy of 
absolute war. Whereas Clausewitz’s and the geophilosopher’s 
notion of an absolute is limited here, we suggest an 
absoluteness beyond the very bounds of the terrestrial—the 
possibility of total planetary annihilation.80 As Guha puts it, 
even the Deleuzo-Guattarian war machine fails to grasp 
SIMAD as the earth is softened and slime-ified by its 
hypercamouflaged discord.81 
76Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 162. 
77Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 354. 
78Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 355. 
79Manabrata Guha, “Introduction to SIMADology: Polemos in the 21st 
Century,” COLLAPSE VI: Geo/Philosophy (January 2010): 342 [323–
378]. 
80Guha, “Introduction to SIMADology,” 326. 
81Guha, “Introduction to SIMADology,” 328. 




2.4. A BRIEF NOTE ON DIRECTIONALITY 
 
It is important to not forget, however, that the very spatiality 
of up, down, left, and right, and even internal and external, 
bears an anthropocentric ghost. As Buckminster Fuller 
argued, when we go up and down we are actually going in and 
out in relation to the Earth. That is, “up” and “down” ignore 
the bending of gravity. Furthermore, the concepts of sunset 
and sunrise invoke a flat earth, where in reality, the terms 
should be replaced by sunclipse and sunsight, as the exper-
ience of the earth as phenomenologically flat does not override 
the earth as a sphere. While folk terms have a certain utility, 
the theoretical and philosophical weight they bring with them 
needs to be interrogated.  
 Any sense of directionality we invoke is always in 
relation to the Earth or one of its energetic components. 
Compasses utilize pieces of the Earth to help us follow fixed 
directions, directions which are aligned with the Earth’s 
magnetic field, yet these field lines are not themselves 
completely stable. If directionality was a movement on or in 
relation to only the surface, then movement upwards (away 
from the planet) would not require the massive amounts of 
energy that it does. The same can be said of exploring the 
ocean depths, as moving beneath so much raw matter requires 
special preparation for humans to survive, suggesting the 
impossibility of any ground under the water to finally rest on. 
One could also take the framing of the central narrative 
disaster in James Cameron’s The Abyss (1989) as a reminder of 
this fact. In the film, the underwater station falls deeper 
underwater, re-ungrounding the experience of the terrestrial 
and emphasizing that the fall is towards the center of the earth 
and not any particular direction as we might want to perceive 
it. Human feet do not determine the reference point for all 
directionality. 
To shift back to another science fictional register, the 
gigantic worm writhing through tellurian space unlocks all 
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concepts of horizontality. The immensity of the worm appears 
as a surface effect, but when it disappears beneath the surface, 
the vortex shifts from the horizontal of space (<) to the 
vertical of the terrestrial (⋁). Caves, tunnels, and surface 
mines expand the horizontal ungrounding to its limit, as the 
spherical nature of the Earth is simultaneously ignored and 
tested through the sideways expansion of boring, worming, 
and so forth. 
Vertical ungrounding is that which moves through the 
surface (through the ground), as both an internal circling and 
softening of the earth towards collapse (worming), and also as 
an external bombardment or piercing of the tellurian (as in 
the planet-destroying machine). Whereas horizontal un-
grounding relies on a pre-established surface or ground in 
order to engage its destructive machinations, vertical 
ungroundings—those of the vortex—threaten to undo the 
ground beyond its deepest terrestrial bound. 
 Nero’s enemy ship the Narrada (in Abrams’ Star Trek), 
discussed above, is of particular interest because it combines 
both types of ungrounding. It drills deep into the core of the 
Earth while injecting a special type of matter to begin forming 
a black hole in the planet’s center, thereby consuming it from 
the inside. The ungrounding is not only simultaneously 
internal and external, but it creates a vortex that in itself is the 
minimalist representation of an object, the most basic 
interruption of the process of being, as already demonstrated 
in Schelling’s whirlpool. If being is process, and the 
appearance of being is an arrest of that material flow, then it 
becomes difficult to separate grounding from ungrounding 
without the ground of either the subject or nature-
independent thought. As Iain Hamilton Grant explains, 
If . . . ground is always and irrevocably particular, 
then natural history can investigate the grounding 
of ground, but, again in virtue of the nature of the 
subject of nature, ‘nothing original ever appears 




itself’. In brief, the transcendental phenomenon has 
a physical ground, but physical ground is a product 
of the dynamic ungrounding that precedes it as the 
subject of nature itself.82 
 
Grant explains, contra Deleuze, that ungrounding forces lead 
to grounds or groundings in a realist sense—that is, a sense 
outside of our thinking. Instead of the transcendental escaping 
the physical or overriding it in a Kantian sense, the 
transcendental is an effect of the deeper power of nature, as 
the transcendental can never stand alone but only in relation 
to some thing, as Schelling argues in The Grounding of Positive 
Philosophy.83 
What then is the fundamental difference between the 
darkening of the internal ungrounding of worming and the 
blackening of the external ungrounding of planet demolish-
ing? Darkening functions as a hole-making, an absencing of 
the solidity of the interior, whereas blackening has a more 
fundamental ontological acidity, as it tries to make more space 
out of space. The useful ramifications of both internal and 
external ungrounding will be explored in the conclusion. 
The central concern, the bone passing through both 
fleshes of these odd machines, is that of time.
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Let’s not forget that buildings sit on the Earth.  
Lebbeus Woods 
 







The errant signals, distress calls, and anomalous readings of 
science fiction lead to the Cthuluoid ethical encounter of an 
unavoidable encounter with the weird.84 One codification of 
the weird is in the trope of the found text, which redoubles the 
shocking foundness of the weird. Other codifications of the 
weird come in spatial and temporal forms. We can see the 
temporally weird at work in tropes of the mythic and ancient, 
or of the futuristic penetrating the past (Stargate’s alien 
Egyptians). We can see the spatially weird at work in common 
science fiction tropes, such as distant planets, dimensional 
rifts, wormholes, and so on. Both the temporally and spatially 
weird unground, ground, and reground in fantastical ways. 
                                                                                  
84For Negarestani, Cthuloid ethics is an ethics of radical openness, 
that of ‘what is next?’ Such an ethics is open to radical butchering, an 
openness far more dangerous than Levinas’ ethics, which amounts to 
an ethics of affordance and not openness. 
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The fabric of time and space, assumed to be absolute, comes 
into question in the aforementioned foundness of the text, and 
the text (as a text) echoes the torsion of time itself in time—
that is, the tangible movement of time as synchronic time. It is 
for these reasons that, in exemplary sci-fi horror (such as the 
Alien series, Event Horizon, The Thing), something has already 
happened and the current action is trying to discover what 
happened or whether what happened is going to happen 
again. 
Alien and weird objects show all objects to be spatially 
disturbing in a literal horizontal fashion: things simply get in 
the way as that which we must move through or around. But 
there is also a vertical depth to objects soaked in allure and 
fascination, by which we are caught. This is the question of 
substance, which we will work to complicate, beginning with 
Bruno Latour’s black boxes, Graham Harman’s commentary 
on Latour, and Harman’s own elaborations of objects (where 
objects become non-relational as such). The replacement of 
substance with black boxes raises the problem of networking, 
as Harman’s critique shows, because they harness a deeper 
structure. That is, for Harman, it is not only an object’s place 
in a network that matters, because an object contains a depth 
that cannot be accounted for in purely relational terms. 
 Harman’s Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and 
Metaphysics provides an extensive review of Latour’s corpus 
before providing a critique of what Harman sees as Latour’s 
reduction of the object in Actor Network Theory (ANT). This 
critique focuses on the fact that, for Harman, an object is not 
merely revealed in its actions, connections or networks,85 but 
has a vacuum-sealed core that is irreducible, that persists 
without relations. Harman’s object oriented ontology, 
following a critical elaboration of Heidegger’s tool-analysis, 
asserts that objects consistently withdraw from us. As Harman 
85Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Meta-
physics, (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 131. 






Contrary to the most typical reading of Heidegger, 
the tool-being of objects cannot be its unconscious 
usefulness for humans in opposition to its 
conscious visibility. . . . Any sort of human relation 
to objects will inevitably fail to grasp them as they 
are.86 
 
The weirdness of objects (and their ontological and 
epistemological accessibility) is further complicated by time 
and time is made manifest in the earth that buries the object, 
obfuscating the history—as well as the capacity—of the 
object’s relationality. 
The xeno-archaeological or exo-archaeological assists in 
wasting or withering the anthropocentricity of worlds (against 
Kant and Badiou) in a twofold sense. The foundness of the big 
dumb object (the Clarke-Kubrick Monolith, Doom 3’s soul 
cube, Dead Space’s Marker) demonstrates the existence of 
non-human intelligence and being, as well as the possible end 
of civilization. These objects are dumb in the sense of being 
hyper-fetishistically presented as excessive in their object-
hood. Nick Bostrom’s essay, “Where are They? Why I Hope 
the Search for Extraterrestrial Life Finds Nothing,” explores 
the anxiety of whether the end to life is early on in life’s 
development or much later (whether through a civilization’s 
self-destruction, a cosmological event that destroys life in its 
germinal state, or something else entirely). Bostrom’s point is 
that one should hope that the search for life finds nothing, 
because this would suggest that the development of life, if it 
ceased, happens early on, and if it were terminated by a much 
later event, this would mean bad news for the human species, 
                                                                                  
86Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the 
Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 74. 
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as we may be hurtling toward our inevitable self-destruction.87 
Big dumb objects could suggest that civilizations are few 
and far between, possibly leading to exaggerated attempts at 
communicating, marking, or reaching out towards other 
civilizations and intelligences. Or, big dumb objects could be 
the metastasization of the technological excess of auto-
apocalyptic ends. The final question is whether extelligence 
(Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart’s term for intelligence that can 
export itself in the form of records88) is particularly rare, or if 
species with the capacity for extelligence simply tend to 
exterminate themselves. 
Objects become inherently weird, or perhaps, in 
Negarestani’s terms, they become the thing without genesis 
(i.e., the sacred).89 The alien object/strange artifact generates 
mystery (if it generates anything at all), whether it is known to 
be ancient or disputed, often due to its impossible construc-
tion or infinitely long history. A search for the missing object, 
or an attempt to reconstruct the object, is often implied (the 
Lord of the Rings trilogy is an odd reversal: instead of a search 
to find and harness the powers of the object, there is a long 
trek to destroy the object, to take it apart, thereby returning it 
to the very fire of its creation—a process of devolution). With 
the odd or long temporality, there is also an ambiguous 
location or manual (“They are digging in the wrong place,” 
such as in Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, or, “There is 
always a manual,” such as in Luc Besson’s The Fifth Element). 
Manual misreading often leads to death (holy grail, ark of the 
covenant, amulets, etc.) or the repetition of the horror that has 
already taken place, as is the case with some sci-fi horror 
87Nick Bostrom, “Why I Hope the Search for Extraterrestrial Life 
Finds Nothing,” COLLAPSE V: The Copernican Imperative 
(February 2009): 333–348. 
88Ian Stewart and Jack Cohen, Figments of Reality: The Evolution of 
the Curious Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
89Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 244. 





 In this narrative structure, the weapon must always be 
destroyed, forgotten, or rendered inoperable, but with the 
possibility that it may re-emerge to ‘fall into the wrong hands’ 
again. Hence the temporality is ancient—always retracted but 
always reappearing in any possible present, which necessitates 
orders, brotherhoods, cults, etc. to protect it, to keep watch 
(The Ninth Gate, the fellowship of the ring, the monks in The 
Fifth Element, knights of the holy grail). These orders must 
readily copy this odd temporality to protect humanity at large. 
 Spatially, then, the odd object can pop up anywhere, yet 
only a few move towards it, and only a few recognize it or 
know what the object is. The oddness of an alien artifact’s 
spatiality is its disrespect for space—constantly rupturing, 
bending or otherwise contorting or piercing space itself. 
 The purportedly ageless or ancient quality allows it to 




3.2. STRANGE TEMPORALITIES 
 
Quentin Meillassoux, in his small but watershed text After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, rallies 
against postmodern discourses that would bind knowing to 
reality as perceived by human subjects, thereby locking the 
world into human parameters—a problematic system of 
knowledge that Meillassoux names correlationism. 
Meillassoux writes: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying 
the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of 
subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”91  
                                                                                  
90It could be argued that, aside from John Carpenter’s The Thing 
(1982), all sci-fi horror films fail, as they inevitably transform into 
another form of horror (by introducing a human enemy) or become 
another kind of sci-fi (by ending on a classic utopian note). 
91Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
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 As an affront to correlationism, Meillassoux proposes 
arche-fossils: objects which “[indicate] the existence of an 
ancestral reality or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial 
life.”92 
 Meillassoux argues that these objects (which are also 
statements) damage any assertion that would claim the 
ontological priority of human thought in the universe. Meilla-
ssoux systematically addresses the possible correlationist 
rejoinders, beginning with the fact that the primary response 
would be that the literal or realist meaning of the statement is 
overridden by its givenness or the fact that anything must be 
always already for us.93 This is the trick of philosophy: 
accepting the real as unthinkable.94 
 While Ray Brassier seems to support a theory of objects 
in themselves in his text Nihil Unbound—that is, that certain 
things pre-exist our experience—he is critical of Meillassoux’s 
arche-fossil because it maintains the distinction between 
anthropocentric time and cosmological time, which allows 
phenomenologists to disregard pre-experiential time as not 
existing properly until it is grasped by thought, and therefore 
Meillassoux’s ancestral realm is a reservoir “waiting” to be 
intuited. The common thread here is that the mythical view of 
man, the view that any experience prior to the emergence of 
humanity only has value as it is researched or dug up through 
our experience, allows for a narrative which is contingent only 
to serve the centrality of human experience. It is for this 
reason that correlationist philosophy, philosophy that pays 
particular heed to Heidegger, is damaging to philosophy 
proper. 
 While we have invoked and continue to harness Bruno 
Latour’s concept of the black box, Latour’s concept of 
temporality, which is articulated largely in The Pasteurization 
Contingency (London: Continuum, 2008), 5. 
92Meillassoux, After Finitude, 10. 
93Meillassoux, After Finitude, 14. 
94Meillassoux, After Finitude, 27. 




of France,95 causes a great deal of worry. Because objects, for 
Latour, are best understood when they are in action, and in 
relation with other objects, he states that ferments did not 
exist prior to Pasteur’s discovery of them since they had no 
visible relations.96 Latour is not saying that the ferments have 
no reality, but that, since other relations must ultimately 
define them and what they can do, they would exist in an 
entirely different way.97 Still, Latour, like Meillassoux, seems 
to suggest two temporalities, perhaps something inherited 
from Deleuze (as Aion and Chronos). As part of our combat 
against such temporal divisions, we will engage grounding and 
ungrounding from the buried object. 
 The depth of the black box, in the alien object, is sealed 
from inquiry and analysis, yet it nevertheless perforates the 
exterior with its seemingly endlessly inaccessible interiority. 
Substance (as black matter, yet also errantly networked) 
becomes the interplay of interiority and exteriority, which is 




Substance becomes an axis of immensity/minisculity, moving 
towards the interior and the exterior. An odd object, then, is to 
be found where these movements are even less discernible 
than they are in everyday objects. 
 Not that objects are all readily discernible in their 
coordinates, but the odd object is unhinged even in its spatio-
temporality, which is usually traceable in most objects. We try 
to discern the interior of the odd object to replicate it, but its 
pushing outwards, its rupturing of time and space, re-doubles 
its withdrawnness. 
 As Negarestani says of the relic, it is that which binds 
                                                                                  
95Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan 
and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
96Harman, Prince of Networks, 83. 
97Harman, Prince of Networks, 83. 
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phenomenologies to temporalities: “a relic is an operative of 
exhumation which confounds the chronological time by 
connecting Now with abyssal time scales.”98 Relics, and the 
exhumations which bring them forth from the terrestrial 
depths, disturb the purportedly flat (both temporally and 
spatially) surface of the earth. Negarestani explains: 
Exhumation undermines the order of strata. . . . 
Exhumation is the invocation of the ground’s 
potencies before they are actualized. . . . Since 
ungrounding or exhumation incapacitates the con-
solidating power of ground, the earth cannot be 
narrated by its outer surface any longer but only by 
its plot holes, vermicular traces of exhumation.99 
The nature of the connection between the abyssal and the now 
deserves some scrutiny if we are to avoid the temporal pitfalls 
of both Latour and Meillassoux. This connection is not a 
bridge across difference, across two ontological regimes of 
time, but across two experiences of measuring them that are 
often taken to be ontologically distinct: deep time and 
quotidian time. 
3.3. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POTENTIALITIES 
Negarestani’s own analysis or schizo-archive of odd objects 
and alien artifacts is connected to exhumation, particularly in 
the case of those labeled as inorganic demons.100 Negarestani 
speaks of their aloneness, their status as contagion vectors, and 
as forsaken things. Often in horror, fantasy, and science 
fiction, the relics are weapons either complete or broken in 
98Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 242. 
99Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 239. 
100Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 223. 





 Whether weapon or otherwise, the relic or alien object 
functions as either an “internalizing” or an “externalizing” 
object; either by pulling energy, objects, flows, etc., inwards 
(as part of some transformative act) or by exposing others to 
its energy, influence, etc. We could take the mysterious 
monolith from Kubrick’s (as well as Arthur C. Clarke’s) 2001: 




 The effect of the monolithic computers ranges from 
advancing primate evolution to causing a kind of super-
insanity/super-consciousness in the protagonist. These mono-
lithic computers are vectors of viruses of ideation constructed 
by the oldest species of the galaxy, the firstborn. They are 
virtually indestructible automatons which can teleport, self-
replicate, open a gate that allows for faster than light travel, 
and may have dimensions beyond normal perception. They 
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are constructed to be impenetrable objects that manipulate the 
environment around them. The firstborn wanted monoliths to 
promote, developmentally, the advancement of intelligent 
species across the universe. This problem assumes, going back 
to Nick Bostrom’s essay, that intelligent life must self-destruct 
often, unless the end of life appears earlier on. 
 The monoliths are objects that not only connect the now 
to abyssal time scales, but were also designed to address the 
disjunction between lived time and a realist sense of deep 
time, or, more precisely, future time. The firstborn designed 
the monoliths to continue their experiments far beyond their 
own existence. 
 In many ways, the puzzle boxes of the Hellraiser films 
function as the opposite of the monoliths, as they are a kind of 
pleasure object or inward-turning object. The boxes, which are 
also known as Lemarchand’s boxes, come in various config-
urations, the most popular being the Lament Configuration. 
The boxes function as gateways to another dimension, one 
where pain and pleasure become indistinguishable at the 
hands of the Cenobites, demon-like entities that manipulate 
the flesh of human beings.  
 The puzzle must be rearranged and solved in order to 
open a schism between the world of humans and that of the 
cenobites. The puzzle box of Hellraiser is intensely alluring, 
yet it explodes the darkness of its own interiority outwards 
once the human has solved its riddle. The allure of the box, 
along with the soft musical tones it emanates, works to draw 
in the solver so that he completes the puzzle, unlocking its 
darkness. The puzzleboxes—unlike the monoliths—are 
disgustingly selfish, and time is completely disregarded in the 
weird space of their torture and allure. 
 Allure, following Harman, is “the separation of an object 
from its qualities,”102 the sensual “notes” that stream forth 
from an object and become objects in their own right. 
102Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 153. 




Furthermore, allure pushes the real object to a distance, 
rearranging “our comportment so that we now occupy 
ourselves directly with notes that were previously enslaved to 
some other object of our attention.”103 
 When we engage the puzzle box, we forget its smooth 
blackness (or its gold ornamentation in the film version) as 
our fascination makes the object a kind of thing in itself, 
although rearranged by our perception of its sensual “notes,” 
its “allure” (only superficially re-arranged, it might be added). 
While Harman argues that allure can happen between non-
human actors (as they also “strike” against each other’s sensual 
facades), the problematic issue is whether the language of 
human fascination can be properly divorced from Harman’s 
anti-correlationist, post-phenomenological approach to the 
object. 
 Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter attempts to change passive 
objects into animate things through an engagement with 
Latour, Deleuze, Spinoza, and others, arguing that a certain 
vitalism could help us to reorient ourselves to the agency and 
tendencies of inanimate objects. Bennett begins her book by 
an account of a material fascination. She writes: 
 
Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick. As I encountered these 
items, they shimmered back and forth between 
debris and thing—between, on the one hand, stuff 
to ignore, except insofar as it betokened human 
activity (the workman’s efforts, the litterer’s toss, 
the rat-poisoner’s success), and, on the other hand, 
stuff that commanded attention in its own right, as 
existents in excess of their association with human 
meanings, habits, or projects.104 
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While this quotation from Bennett describes the power of 
things, it also overwhlems them with human affect, or human 
fascination. Like Bennett and Harman, Timothy Morton, in 
The Ecological Thought, attempts to articulate a similar 
materiality that cuts across (or encompasses) the organic and 
the inorganic, calling this concept the mesh.105 Morton writes: 
The ecological thought stirs because the mesh 
appears in our social, psychic, and scientific do-
mains. Since everything is interconnected, there is 
no definite background and therefore no definite 
foreground. Darwin sensed the mesh while ponder-
ing the implications of natural selection.106  
Morton goes on to discuss the mesh in terms more relevant for 
geophilosophy: 
The ecological crisis makes us aware of how 
interdependent everything is. This has resulted in a 
creepy sensation that there is literally no world 
anymore. We’re losing the very ground under our 
feet. In philosophical language, we’re not just losing 
‘ontological’ levels of meaningfulness. We’re losing 
the ‘ontic,’ the actual physical level we trusted for so 
long.107  
Setting aside Morton’s division of the ontic and the 
ontological in terms of meaningfulness, his mesh attempts 
(similar to Bennett and Harman) to give to the inorganic its 
own vitalism and “life,” but this mesh may have, nevertheless, 
too many roots in human brains—and is thereby worthy of 
suspicion. 
105Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 28. 
106Morton, Ecological Thought, 28. 
107Morton, Ecological Thought, 31. 




 Part of my suspicion arises from the lack of a discussion 
of the temporal dimension in Harman, Bennett, and Morton. 
At the end of The Ecological Thought Morton discusses the 
conundrum of hyperobjects—objects that exceed the capture 
and temporalities of the human race (such as plutonium, 
global warming, etc.). Morton does not elaborate on the 
relations between objects, temporality, and allure. The alien 
artifact and the act of exhumation both engage these three 
themes simultaneously, yet the radical theories of objects and 
of the vibrant (and supposedly non-correlationist) materiality 
of things cannot really account for a temporal allure—that is, 
the possibility of a non-human fascination with objects within 
inhuman and post-human time scales.108 
 The difficulty will hinge upon considering relics as tools 
for a new geophilosophy—and not merely as objects that 
would index past human cultures, the traces of which happen 
to be encased in a useless earth. Because Latour’s objects are 
so connected across various actions that they reverse time, and 
Harman’s objects are so vacuum-sealed that time seems to 
manipulate only an object’s surface effects, Latour and 
Harman thereby evade the problem of genesis. 
 Instead of focusing on allure and fascination, one might 
attempt to explain objects as part of a generative nature, and 
not merely one that is meshed, withdrawn, or vital. 
 
 
3.4. THE ORGANIC/INORGANIC BLUR 
 
 Bennett, in further arguing that things have a force of 
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themselves, argues that humans, as things, have a kind of 
power—but that we need to readjust our sense of time to see 
this power.109
Bennett talks specifically about the process of 
mineralization. After engaging the work of Manuel De Landa, 
Bennett writes: 
In the long and slow time of evolution, then, 
mineral material appears as the mover and shaker, 
the active power, and the human beings, with their 
much-lauded capacity for self-directed action, 
appear as its product.110 
Bennett does not return to the problematic nature of 
fascination, however, nor does she consider how thought and 
life are forms and terms that might need serious revision.111 
 Going back to Hägglund’s articulation of the trace as 
well as Meillassoux’s arche-fossil, we can see that the relic, the 
alien artifact, and so forth, all suggest patterns not only of past 
life but of the cycle of extinction for all life (or perhaps of all 
recognizable activity, regardless of its organic or inorganic 
status). 
 We would like very much to be able to wipe someone or 
something off the face of the earth, but such an action is 
beyond our capabilities. The constant reminder of the relic 
speaks not only to the stubbornness of objects but also to the 
trace structure that they invoke—that life comes from and 
leaves behind traces that, while seemingly completely separate 
from life (in terms of an organic/inorganic distinction), in fact 
complicate any attempt to ontologically quarantine life in 
109Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 10–11. 
110Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 11. 
111 Bennett has, however, previously addressed an entire book to the 
subject of fascination and its relation to ethics; see Jane Bennett, The 
Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 




order to privilege it from non-life. This cocooning allows for 
further qualifications of life as it is injected either with pure 
immanence (Michel Henry), joy (Deleuze), will or power 
(Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, etc.), and so forth. 
 As Ligotti puts it wonderfully in “The Sect of the Idiot,” 
“Life is a nightmare that leaves its mark upon you in order to 
prove that it is, in fact, real.”112 Videogames, strangely enough, 
                                                                                  
112Thomas Ligotti, “The Sect of the Idiot,” in Songs of a Dead Dreamer 
(Burton: Subterranean Press, 2010), 238. One of Ligotti’s main 
inspirations is Arthur Schopenhauer, whom he engages at length in 
his remarkable text, The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. 
Schopenhauer is of particular use, as his pessimism—being far more 
radical than Nietzsche’s—allows for a truly contingent and decaying 
nature. One particular danger of such extreme pessimism, as 
Wolfgang Schirmacher shows, is that, 
 
The human being, according to Schopenhauer, is of all 
suffering creatures the only one that through insight can break 
the cycle of eat-and-be-eaten and thus become a paragon for all 
creation. The voluntary extinguishing of the will to life in 
ourselves would allow humaneness to triumph over nature. 
What at first appeared as resignation would then reveal itself to 
be a successful way out. 
 But can something that looks like collective suicide by the 
human species be called successful? Today, anthropofugal im-
pulses are stronger than ever, and it doesn’t take a prophet to 
predict our species’ suicide within the next millennium. A 
humanity that simply continues as usual with its theory and 
practice, its conflict management and ideology of progress, is 
doomed. Admitting to ourselves that the conflicts are 
unresolvable, that with the theoretical and practical means we 
have at our disposal we are merely attempting to treat the 
symptoms: such an admission could well amount to a turning 
point. But lobbyists, whether they receive their mandate from 
the state, the economy, culture, or religion, reject any notion of 
admitting to their own bankruptcy. They see self-criticism 
merely as a strategy for entrenching their own influence.  
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have the most bizarre articulations of strange forms of life. 
The game Deadspace, in particular, has a fascinating form of 
life with strange geophysical horrors. 
 In the game, a massive space ship goes to a planet in 
order to crack it, to remove a giant piece of the planet’s crust 
for mining purposes. Before beginning the operation, the crew 
discovers a marker, a large stone object covered in markings 
believed to be a holy relic by a paranoiac Scientology-like 
religion. Humans in the vicinity of the marker become 
enraged and begin killing one another on the planet’s colony, 
and soon it becomes obvious something is amiss.  
 A microorganism, a particularly nasty creature of awful 
bio-spatial plasticity, begins to mutate humans into grotesque 
monsters multiplying and misaligning their body parts. The 
marker, as a container of mutagenic life, indexes the emer-
gence of life from non-life, thereby hammering home the 
contingency and pure materiality of the category of life. While 
See Wolfgang Schirmacher, “Technoculture and Life Technique,” in 
Just Living: Philosophy in Artificial Life (New York: Atropos Press, 
forthcoming), 3. 




Bennett addresses the possibility of non-organic life, she relies 
on Deleuze’s concept of life as immanent.113 As already 
discussed in 1.1 above, Deleuze’s concept of immanence relies 
on nature as pre-thinkable, thereby undercutting nature’s 
creative and destructive vitality. 
 To return to Bennett’s exploration of mineralization, we 
see that living things, and in particular entities such as 
humans, thought to be separate (whether theologically or 
technologically) from the engine of nature, are in fact 
themselves stratified by processes. The capacity of a brain to 
think cannot be ontologically different from the process of 
mineralization; the difference must be grasped in terms of the 
interiorizing and exteriorizing potentialities of the ontic 
layering of the world. 
 As a final note, the odd life of vital materialism and 
regrounding can be found in Bryan Singer’s Superman Returns 
(2006). In the film, Superman’s arch-nemesis Lex Luthor goes 
to the Fortress of Solitude (Superman’s miniature crystal 
island, located in the arctic) and steals a piece of crystal 
technology that originated on Superman’s home planet 
Krypton. Luthor then breaks into a museum and acquires a 
meteorite fragment of Krypton, binding the materials together 
before launching them into the ocean. The weaponized 
crystal-mineral quickly grows into a new continent that, due 
to water displacement, will drown most of the United States 
and coastal regions around the world. 
 Luthor creates the one commodity that is always in 
demand:  new earth. Furthermore, Luthor binds kryptonite to 
the crystal in order to protect it from Superman, thereby pre-
radiating a new landmass to keep Superman at bay. In order to 
destroy Luthor’s material act of regrounding, Superman 
literally ungrounds the entire continent by burrowing beneath 
it, ripping the crystal out of the ground, and tossing it into the 
sun. We can see this as indexing Negarestani’s conflict of the 
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earth’s insider with the sun. The weaponization of the earth, as 
we explore geocontainment in the next section, speaks to the 
vitalism of the inorganic, in that it is both as generative as 
organic life and more temporally stable than the organic. 
 Instead of appreciating the longevity of the organic, as 
well as its instability (i.e., it is not merely a ground to walk 
upon), approaches characterized by what I will call 
geocontainment demonstrate that the earth and the process of 
stratification become a massive grave to bear, hold, and 
conceal, especially in accordance with phenomenology and 
humanistic concerns. 
3.5. GEOCONTAINMENT, OR THE PANIC OF BURIAL 
In addition to the relics, the exhumed, and cataclysmic 
mineralization, there are also the geotechnics of hyper-
futuristic technology and the oddness of the assumption that 
anything stays buried. This is true of both the animate and 
inanimate. Eastern and Western modes of burial differ 
significantly in their articulation of the “homeness” of the 
dead, employing vastly different forms of thanato-
stratification. As Kristen Alvanson argues in “Elysian Space in 
the Middle East,” the dead in the Middle East are buried on 
top of one another with flat stones atop of them so that 
passers-by can walk on them and across the markings of the 
dead. Alvanson writes, 
The site of the graveyard bridges the ontological 
contents of the living and the post-mortem pro-
trusion of these contents, thus marking the 
transition from ontology to theatrical ontology.114 
114Kristen Alvanson, “Elysian Space in the Middle East,” COLLAPSE 
II: Speculative Realism  (March 2007): 257 [257–271]. 




Put otherwise, the graveyard binds the affect of ontology to 
ontology at an obscenely intimate level. Furthermore, Alvan-
son argues that Islamic graveyards disrupt regular thinking 
since, following Heidegger, dwelling is bound to thinking and 
Islamic graveyards flatten all capacity for dwelling.115 It 
becomes impossible to stand apart from the dead, and one is 
always standing on top of them. This bearing of the dead is, 
from the Western point of view, too close for comfort, as the 
earth is supposed to separate the dead from the processes of 
mourning that occur “above ground.” 
 The necrological and the geocentric are subsequently 
joined, regenerating the ideological split of the ecocentric and 
anthropocentric. The Earth is reterritorialized to function as 
the final home for bodies supposedly both hidden and 
protected. Ashes to ashes, dust to dust: this kind of thinking 
ontologically deadens the earth in order to cement the theo-
logical or otherwise supra-anthropocentric divide between the 
body and the spirit. 
 How far back the religiosity of burial goes is a contested 
issue. The burial of the dead goes back at least as far as Homo 
sapiens communities dating to hundreds of thousands of years 
ago. There is, of course, no way to know whether burial occur-
red because of social, spiritual, or merely practical reasons. 
But the earth as ultra-grave is not only for the burial of expired 
organic life, but is also sought out for the containment of 
dangerous chemicals and radiation. 
 In the Nevada desert lies Yucca Mountain, formed 
millions of years ago by ashen explosions from cauldron-like 
volcanoes composed of pyroclastic rock. Its thermal 
characteristics make the location an excellent candidate for the 
disposal of radioactive waste, and over the last twenty years 
the mountain has been molded for just this purpose through 
massive portals dug into the rock. Large alcoves were 
hollowed with explosives to make room for scientific 
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experiments. 
 Millions of dry casks filled with heavy metals were to be 
transported via truck and rail. As of the present moment, the 
repository’s opening is to be scaled back and perhaps 
eliminated all together. Deep geological repositories are 
modeled after naturally occurring fission reactors, such as in 
Oklo, Africa, where the local groundwater is protected by 
layers of sandstone and granite. Oklo shows that the central 
problematic is not the containment capacity of the repository, 
but the questionable stabilities that arise once the waste needs 
to be moved to the site. Much of the concern over Yucca 
Mountain has been construed in terms of terrorist fantasies 
revolving around the possible theft of materials to construct 
dirty bombs as they are transported by train. Our concern 
here, however, is not the potential logistical and political 
disasters that could result from such transportation, but the 
geo-mechanical implications of the support for these deep 
repositories and the possible responses to them.  
 Sites such as Yucca Mountain imply the possibility of an 
absolute solution for the burial of the problematic waste of 
modern life. That is, Yucca Mountain is posited as a 
permanent burial site meant to contain what is never to be 
moved again. Its out-of-sightness, seemingly in support of the 
Husserlian dictum that “the earth does not move,” seems more 
than slightly dismissive of the future of the earth and the 
capacity of human stewardship (although, human life may not 
have much longevity). Even the very practical operation of 
waste management demonstrates the inflexibility of 
anthropocentric thought’s determination of life over nature, a 
life that is not the possibility of organicity, but is rather a 
phenomenologized form of life in the Kantian sense. 
Furthermore, the earth is codified as a ground, but a dead 
ground—a platform for human activity from which ideation 
somehow manages to escape.  
 Another repository’s fixity has taken on an almost 
demonological appearance: at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 




in Loving, New Mexico, designed to house transuranic 
radioactive waste for 10,000 years, an interdisciplinary 
collaboration is attempting to design a massive temple of 
warning to any living being that would approach the site, 
communicating its message in a slew of languages and 
pictographs to ward off any future investigator. One proposal 
suggests the construction of fearsome looking spikes to 
convey danger and harm.116 
 But one can imagine, as similar things have occurred in 
various science fiction works, that a fearsome looking temple 
would only facilitate attraction and allure—an elaborate 
construction, regardless of its fearsomeness, would invite 
investigation. 
 Even more radical than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is 
the Russian Hot Drop Project, which argues that spent nuclear 
material should be deposited in the depths of the earth. 
Instead of digging a deep well, the project’s scientists argued 
that the waste cold be placed in a ball of tungsten and heated 
up to 1,200 degrees Celsius so that it well melt its way down to 
a safe distance. 
 Such elaborate constructions and measures only further 
suggest the oddness of a purportedly permanent solution in a 
purportedly dead earth. The assumption of an already dead 
Earth is clearly apparent in the fact that waste is to be placed 
between the water table and the surface. It is not that a system 
can be made that will not fail, but that the Earth is represented 
as having an inert character it does not have simply for peace 
of mind. The neglect of the Earth’s dynamism is coupled with 
the strange desire for waste to remain unseen. 
 The purported permanence of Yucca Mountain invokes 
another strange philosophic dimension, not in terms strictly 
relevant to the earth and its reduction to a body, but in an odd 
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temporality. The buried wastes are a byproduct of contem-
porary practices that threaten the physical continuity of 
human existence.  
 This threat is ignored, most likely due to the 
anthropocentric delusion that the transcendental ego will 
somehow outlive biological death. Or, to put it another way, 
the infinite time of burial at Yucca Mountain functions to 
house human waste in order to guarantee the endless time of 
human thought.  
 The ecological burial of the wasted present to save the 
abstract vitality of human consciousness denies the power of 
matter and earth to propagate new forms of life, quarantining 
the parallel putrefaction of our actual being as well as the 
truths of putrefaction, necrosis, and (radioactive) decay, all 
stirred in an anthropically corrupted temporality. 
 The real meaning of terrestrial burial and of earthly 
temporality, following Jan Zalasiewicz, is simply that the earth 
will ultimately bury us and every single trace of our existence. 
On long enough time scales, all relics and artifacts will be 
demolished. As Zalasiewicz writes in The Earth After Us, 
The surface of the earth is no place to preserve deep 
history. The surface of the future Earth, one 
hundred million years from now, will not have 
preserved evidence of contemporary human 
activity. One can be quite categorical about this. 
Whatever arrangement of oceans and continents, 
or whatever stat of cool or warmth will exist then, 
the Earth’s surface will have been wiped clean of 
human traces.117 
To return to the nuclear, it is, of course, not merely a 
byproduct of power generation, but also a naturally occurring 
117Jan Zalasiewicz, The Earth After Us: What Legacy Will Humans 
Leave in the Rocks? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 14. 




phenomenon in radioactive isotopes. The natural advent of 
radioactive isotopes has allowed for the weaponization of the 
earth itself, moving us back to the demonic and the infernal. 
 In The BLDGBLOG Book, author Geoff Manaugh 
suggests that a passage in Milton’s Paradise Lost anticipates 
(in some mix of literality and metaphor) the discovery of an 
earthy superweapon, possibly uranium: a stone with massively 
explosive potential. Manaugh quotes the following from 
Paradise Lost in service of Milton the Atomist: 
 
These in their dark nativity the Deep, Shall yield us, 
pregnant with infernal flame, Which, into hollow 
engines long and round Thick-rammed, at the other 
bore with touch of fire.118 
 
 Besides the obvious examples of weaponization and the 
apocalyptic capacities of the nuclear, plutonium has been 
used, in mostly abortive attempts, to redesign the earth both 
above and below the surface. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
at Livermore Radiation Laboratory in California, scientists 
theorized that nuclear weapons could be used to create 
harbors and canals.119 The Plowshare program proposed even 
using nuclear bombs to create more direct train routes in the 
southwest United States.120 As Tom Zoellner notes in 
Uranium, the Plowshare program began with Project 
Gnome,121 in which a nuclear device was going to be detonated 
under the ground to boil water in the aquifer in order to 
generate power from the steam. Despite the initial tests’ 
complete failure, over two dozen more warheads were 
detonated. 
 Even more ridiculous combinations of massive weapons 
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and geophysics are possible. Manaugh suggests a possible 
future with terrestrial weaponization resulting from the 
accidents of experiments. Manaugh writes: “In late 2006, 
Swiss engineers found to their surprise that they had set off a 
series of small tremors in the city of Basel when they began 
injecting water into a freshly drilled geothermal well on the 
outskirts of the town.”122 Even stranger, Manaugh continues, 
“Taipei 101, one of the tallest (and heaviest) buildings on 
earth, might actually have reopened a dormant fault beneath 
the island nation of Taiwan.”123 There is not much more to say 
than Zalasiewicz does about the chaos of the surface of the 
Earth: “Our planet is too active, its surface too energetic, too 
abrasive, too corrosive.”124 
 To close, we must burrow deeper into the earth, into the 
strange potentiality of infernal geologies. 
122Manaugh, The BLDGBLOG Book, 240. 
123Manaugh, The BLDGBLOG Book, 240. 
124Zalasiewicz, The Earth After Us, 15. 
 
 





The world is deep: and deeper than day has ever 
comprehended. 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 
4.1. HELL IN (>), OR INFERNOLOGY AS GEOPHILOSOPHY 
 
Geoff Manaugh suggests the possibility of a topography of 
hell: 
 
Could we assemble a catalog of landscape 
metaphors and geographical analogies writers have 
used over the centuries to describe this hellish 
underworld? It’s not hard to imagine some obscure 
papal academy in Rome publishing tract after tract 
on the exact geotechnical nature of the Inferno.125 
 
Hell is an all too familiar landscape, often a volcanic region 
with roaming demons or floating rivers of souls more or less 
terrestrial. The first most simple distinction to make is that 
between the chthonic underworld and the non-spatialized 
otherworld.126 For our geophilosophical purposes here it is the 
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former that concerns us. Hell, in its chthonic configuration, 
suggests an odd short circuit between the earth as a shallow 
phenomenological playground and a deeper understanding of 
the earth as a complex geological system. This very distinction 
is blurred by the interchangeability in German transcendental 
philosophy of reason and ground, or between Vernunft and 
Grund.127 
 But before engaging the philosophical dimension, a tour 
of the plane, or perhaps, the colony of hells is necessary. There 
are a plethora of spatial hells: Sheol (the pit or grave), Gehenna 
(the valley just outside of Jerusalem), Hades (as the grave), and 
Infernus (what lies underneath). Negarestani discusses the 
place of the abomination beyond the dung gate thereby 
situating hell as landfill in the following manner: 
Near the city of Jerusalem, behind the Dung Gate 
(Nehemiah 2:13), in the valley of Hinnom, Tophet 
or the Place of Abomination was located. The Dung 
Gate (an architectural climax for urban-waste), as 
described in the book of Nehemiah, was at the 
southernmost tip of Jerusalem, near the Pool of 
Siloam. It was a main exist to the Valley of Hinnom 
(ge hinnom), where the city disposed of its garbage. 
The valley is a deep, narrow ravine running through 
Jerusalem. . . .  The origin of the name Hinnom is 
not clear, but is usually said to derive from a ‘son of 
Hinnom’ (ge bhen hinnom) who apparently owned 
or had some significant associations with the valley 
at a time prior to Joshua. It is the Hebrew name 
Hinnom that later transforms into the biblical and 
Koranic words for Hell.128 
127Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (London: 
Continuum, 2010), 61. 
128Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 155. 




In addition to these historical places, several popular hell 
mouths have been nominated. The Masaya volcano in Nica-
ragua, the cavern entrance to Mayan hell in Belize, St. 
Patrick’s Purgatory in Ireland, the underground river entrance 
to Hades at the southern tip of Greece, the Hekla volcano in 
Iceland, and, most impressive, the Erta Ale volcano in Africa. 
The overwhelming volcanic nature of the hell mouths will be 
discussed below. First the geographic possibilities of hell must 
be, at least, partially exhausted. 
 Despite the numerous maps of hell within Dante’s 
Inferno, the geologically and geographic descriptions of hell 
are not as prevalent as one would think. There is the lower city 
of hell129 (Dis) and the stench-filled abyss,130 steep slopes above 
rivers of boiling blood,131 and so forth. The most particular 
geological features of Dante’s hell are that of the malebolgia, or 
literally, “evil pockets.”132 The pockets are a series of ten valleys 
filled with the worst sinners of lower hell tormented by their 
demonic slave masters. The malebolgia are another example of 
redoubled ungrounding, or hell inside hell. The very concept 
of a pocketed hell indexes hell as an impossible geo-spatial 
“hold” of misery. 
 Hell becomes a strange fascination of another geological 
space, of the strange distance of geology as it invades non-
theological geological endeavors. 
 
 
4.2. VOLCANIC ORIFICES 
 
In 1970 in the USSR, a scientific adventure began deep into 
the depths of the Earth. Digging past 40,000 feet, the Kola 
Superdeep Borehole found interesting results. The hole, which 
                                                                                  
129Dante, The Divine Comedy, Volume I: Inferno, trans. Mark Musa 
(London: Penguin Books, 1984), 147. 
130Dante, Inferno, 168. 
131Dante, Inferno, 176–177. 
132Dante, Inferno, 231. 
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despite its depth only went through a third of the Earth’s 
crust, encountered strange entities such as rocks filled with 
water and mud boiling with hydrogen gas. An urban legend 
quickly arose. 
 On the History Channel’s Gates of Hell television show, a 
story no doubt related to the borehole project was recounted. 
A bishop and a paranormal investigator who host a radio 
show played an audio recording supposedly captured by 
seismologists who accidentally recorded the screaming of the 
damned when they lowered microphones into the earth. The 
literality of hell rests on the aforementioned split between the 
chthonic and the otherworld, between immanence and 
transcendence. 
 The split between the otherworldly and the chthonic 
parallels the split between Vernunft and Grund, or between the 
transcendental and the immanent. Yet this relation of 
transcendence and immanence is not Kantian or Hegelian but 
Schellingian, and is bound up with the volcanic. The volcanic 
acts a pivot between both hell/earth and transcendence/ 
immanence. As we’ve seen, hell mouths are frequently 
volcanic, and the volcanic has a particular philosophical 
history as well. For example, in Nietzsche: 
There is an island in the sea—not far from the 
Blissful Islands of Zarathustra—upon which a 
volcano continually smokes; the people, and 
especially the old women among the people, say 
that it is placed like a block of stone before the gate 
of the underworld, but that the narrow downward 
path which leads to this gate of the underworld 
passes through the volcano itself.133 
The philosophical assessment of the volcanic is caught in the 
gravity of Empedocles’ apocryphal leap into the fiery breach of 
133Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 152. 




Mount Etna. To this we can add Novalis’ poetic explorations 
of the salt mines where he toiled; Lucretius and Aristotle’s 
theorizations of wind friction deep in the Earth; Plato’s rivers 
of heat; the earth gorging itself on vapor, mountain oil, and 
sulfur, subsequently releasing gas, or, for Johannes Kepler, 
tears and excrement. James Hutton, the father of modern 
geology, conceives of the Earth as a great heat engine, thereby 
marking the shift into a slightly more scientific consideration 
of the terra-depths as infiltrated by actuating powers.134 
 No philosophical articulation of volcanism can match 
Athansius Kircher’s. Kircher, a 17th-century polymath, devot-
ed an entire work, Mundus Subterraneus, to the study of 
volcanoes, concluding that the fiery constructs comprised a 
kind of inverted astronomy. This term was popularized by 
Siegfried Zielinski, who borrowed it from Novalis’ Heinrich 
von Ofterdingen, in which the figure of the hermit states that, 
while the astronomer sees the future in the stars, the 
investigator of the deep past understands the primeval history 
of the earth.135 
 This dark or underground astronomy was further 
solidified by Hölderin’s portrayal of the aforementioned death 
of Empedocles; by tying the worldly thinker to the mytho-
logical figure of Icarus, he thereby linked the distant sun to the 
bubbling lava of Etna. 
 It is here that we can directly engage the volcanic 
transcendental geology of Schelling’s naturephilosophy 
(Naturphilosophie). In Schelling’s post-Kantian naturephilo-
sophy, the earth is both the unground of the transcendental (in 
nature’s capacity to produce thought) and the biological 
graveyard of history (the fact that life itself is subject to the 
flux of nature). This stands in opposition to the already 
discussed somaticism of Kant. 
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4.3. AGAINST OVER-DEMONIZATION 
In other words, for Schelling, the generative nature of the 
earth becomes the very being of transcendence. However, this 
transcendent being is only a being to the extent that it is also a 
productivity. As Grant succinctly puts it: 
The dilemma initially facing a transcendental 
naturalism is accordingly that it must either assert 
determination by contingent entities of whatever 
nature (things, forces) or assert parochialism and 
admit that even in those of its theses that putatively 
address nature, no such address takes place insofar 
as the ‘nature’ in question is phenomenal only.136 
The endless ungrounding of Schelling’s naturephilosophy 
cannot and should not be equated with the sort of infinite 
potentiality found in a Deleuzian virtuality, which remains 
structurally ideal. 
 The specter of anthropocentric thinking, which hides 
best in Deleuzian virtuality, appears as the shadow that 
demonizes hell, and which transforms the geophysical capac-
ities of hell into ones of perverse minds. In other words, 
infernology is often overridden by demonology,137 whether the 
demons are materialized creatures of hell itself or merely 
demons of the mind.138 This is why there are far more demons 
in Difference and Repetition than geophysical transcendences. 
136Iain Hamilton Grant, “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism: 
The Antinomies of Transcendental Naturalism,” COLLAPSE V: The 
Copernican Imperative (February 2009): 421 [415–451]. 
137Turner, The History of Hell, 4.
138See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913), in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. 
and trans. James Strachey, Vol. 13 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), 1–
161, and Christian Kerslake, “Deleuze and Demons,” in Deleuze and 
the Unconscious (London: Continuum, 2007). 




 This fall into demonology is an unfortunate part of Jeff 
Long’s The Descent, where explanations of the reality of the 
sub-earth are dropped in exchange for a realization of demons 
or Homo hadalis. The upshot of this is at least twofold: first, 
Long’s Homo hadalis suggests a deeper connection between 
the innards of the earth and the evolution of human beings, 
and second, it realizes, on a more metaphysical scale, that the 
possibility of being itself is rooted in the darkness of the 
earth.139 
 In temporal terms, hell seems to have a timeless 
dimension, yet time continually penetrates it in order to 
deposit the dead, and then recedes again. Hell is atemporal to 
the degree that time passes through it without harm. 
Furthermore, the fact that Hell can be entered and exited (the 
first being much easier) reinforces the ways in which hell’s 
time can be expanded and contracted. Various tales of 
entering hell speak to the tortures of hell lengthening time. 
Hell-time is drastically out of joint. From this strange space-
time, it is hell’s exports that we seek to glimpse next. 
 
 
4.4. HELL OUT (<) 
 




She tore a hole in our universe. 
Event Horizon 
 
Paul W.S. Anderson’s science fiction horror film Event Hori-
zon is the best experiment in the unkempt spatiality of hell. In 
the film, the ship the Event Horizon disappears for several 
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years and is presumed lost only to reappear in orbit of 
Neptune sending out a distress signal to earth. Another ship, 
the Lewis and Clarke, is sent to investigate the strange message 
which is composed of screaming and mumbled Latin words, 
such as, liberate tuteme ex inferis [“save yourself from hell”]. 
 En route, the ship’s designer Doctor William Weir 
explains that the ship employed an experimental gravity drive 
capable of generating a portal between two points in space, 
enabling it to travel faster than light. After boarding the ship 
and encountering odd horrors, the rescue team soon realizes 
that the ship was in hell, a realm of pure chaos, and that the 
Event Horizon came back as a living entity, driving the crew 
members to madness, causing them to rape and mutilate one 
another, and that this is what has started to happen to the crew 
of the Lewis and Clark. 
 This maddening chaos has a distinctly Meillassouxian 
source. For Meillassoux, the absolute, that which stands as the 
foundation for the possibility of knowledge, is chaos and 
nothing but. As Meillassoux writes, “Our absolute, in effect, is 
nothing other than an extreme form of chaos, a hyper-Chaos, 
for which nothing is or would seem to be impossible, not even 





 In his essay “Subtraction and Contraction,” Meillassoux 
connects themes of chaos to death. Following a Bergsonian 
line of thinking, Meillassoux argues that instead of death 
being a return to the inorganic, death would be a form of 
madness: 
 
If matter is what Bergson says it is, then death . . . 
would not at all be identified with nothing, but 
rather with madness—and even an infinite madness. 
. . . To make an image of death, we would have to 
conceive what our life would be if all the 
movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, 
all the smells, the tastes, all the light—of the earth 
and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an 
instant—like an atrocious screaming tumult of 
things.141 
 
 Event Horizon is interesting simply because hell becomes 
one spatial dimension among many, ripping it from its usual 
chthonic location and giving it its own existence altogether—
an existence which is either the becoming-material of madness 
or the madness of becoming-material. 
 Furthermore, to return to the odd object and alien 
artifact, the work of artifacts perpetuate the mythical/ 
demonological where hell becomes another spatial dimension. 
The alien artifact withers anthropocentricity via the objective 
quality of the object (such as in the opening pages of Žižek’s 
Parallax View). In the weird story, the artifact is hyperbolic in 
its object status is also over-present (withdrawn and too 
close). As we have seen in 3.1 above, the alien artifact is 
withdrawn from a concept of world, but the hellish artifact 
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goes even farther and brings chaos. 
 Whereas the madness of the Event Horizon is contained 
within the ship, the insanity of hell from other sources, such as 
that of the Doom videogame series, is not confined to one 
locale, but seeps out and spills across whole dimensions. 
 In the videogame Doom 3, which is set in 2145, the 
United Aerospace Corporation, the largest corporation in 
existence, has constructed a large research facility on Mars’ 
moon Phobos. As an unnamed marine, you are sent to 
investigate the disappearance of a scientist involved with the 
company’s teleportation experiments. An accident occurs and 
the forces of hell begin to invade the base. While science 
fiction and sci-fi horror have made extensive use of trans-
dimensional portals, Doom 3 does the best job of articulating 
the connection of a non-chthonic or hyper-chaotic extra-
dimensional hell to the possibility of technological jumps 
between dimensions. 
 As the game progresses, you (as the marine) learn that an 
archaeological dig on the surface discovered an odd artifact 
called the soul cube, a device built by an ancient civilization as 




a defense against hell. The cube functions as a miniature 
weaponized hell—gathering souls until it becomes charged. By 
moving off-world, the game is able to maintain the strange 
indexing of the alien artifact as well as the possibility of an 
other-worldly hell becoming a chthonic one as the demons 
attempt to open a portal to earth. 
 The futuro-techno portalization of the hell-gate retro-
actively engenders the seep of hell into other technological 
manifestations, most notably in war, with the phrase “war is 
hell,” and the possibility that things go or went to hell while 
also remaining on Earth’s surface. 
 We can approach this form of insanity via Nick Land’s 
“Meat,” with his ramblings on Heart of Darkness: “Arriving 
reprocessed from inexistence at phase transition into hell, or 
the future. . . . Pandemonium scrolls out in silence.”142 This 
cryptic remark finds roots in The Thirst for Annihilation in the 
following: “the world of work perishes with the One, and that 
zero is the engine of war.”143 Hellish war is, first and foremost, 
a war that does not serve the state,144 and, following Bataille, 
“War is the free movement of solar flow across the earth.”145 
 Jake and Dinos Chapman’s sculpture Fucking Hell (2008) 
further drives the techno-futurism of hell seepage in an 
underhanded way.146 Fucking Hell is a rather large swastika-
shaped diorama which portrays the horror of the holocaust to 
an almost comically exaggerated degree. The scene is filled 
with body parts, speared heads, crucified victims, cybernetic 
Nazi soldiers, emaciated corpses, death camp fences, over-
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stuffed boats and trains, etc. The Chapmans’ piece invokes b-
movie nasties of the 1980s as well as, perhaps indirectly, real-
time-strategy games: it is a war scene viewed from above in 
miniature, but the fog of war is unbearably blown away. 
 Fucking Hell anchors World War II as the nexus for 
techno-futuristic fictional hell mutations, such as Hellboy, 
Doom, and the countless explorations of the Nazi occult. Once 
hell has boiled up to the surface, the purported ontological 
break between “beneath” and “elsewhere” is nullified as 
everything goes to hell in an exercise in Schellingian 
transcendental volcanism, erupting in plumes of hyper-chaos 
and hardening in accursed gems to power future weapons of 
planetary death. 
5: TO CONCLUDE, OR,
A DARK EARTH, A BLACK SUN 
V 
Great star! What would your happiness be, if you 
had not those for whom you shine! . . . I must 
descend into the depths: as you do at evening, when 
you go behind the sea and bring light to the 
underworld too, superabundant star! 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
One might equally denote this planet as the muddy 
planet, for it is the only one to be encased in a thick 
shell of mud and mudrock, being literally envelop-
ed in its own decay products. 
Jan Zalasiewicz, The Earth After Us 
5.1. DARK EARTH 
Throughout Negarestani’s Cyclonopedia, the possibility of a 
tellurian insurgency against the sun is posited, working in the 
vein of a Tiamaterialism, where the earth itself is taken up as a 
weapon against the solar empire.147 The earth, as we have seen, 
does not require much labor to become a monster. The earth 
is a stratified globule, a festering confusion of internalities 
powered by a molten core and bombarded by an indifferent 
147Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 42. 
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star. This productive rottenness breeds the possibility of 
escaping the solar economy through the odd chemistry of 
ontology. The darkness of ground in Schelling, as Grant has 
argued, is a productive one.  
 The earth is “the dark ground of nature”148 that attempts 
to create all on its own while always sinking back into a black 
chaos.149 This odd and failed generation makes itself into 
immanent compost: “everything goes as into its ground; one 
ought rather to say: everything preceding grounded itself by 
the fact that it lowers itself to being the ground of what 
follows.”150 The ground of the earth constantly makes itself the 
ground of something else. Expanding the earth’s productivity, 
Schelling writes: 
The abyss of forces down into which we gaze here 
opens up with the single question: in the first 
construction of our Earth, what can have been the 
ground of the fact that no genesis of new 
individuals is possible upon it, otherwise than 
under the condition of opposite powers?151 
 The earth must be a part of a larger system of forces, a 
system at the cosmic scale152 in which the ground of the earth 
is the dark principal of night,153 all of which, following Lorenz 
148F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of 
Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany: 
State University of New York Press), 44. 
149Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 45. 
150F.W.J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. 
Andrew Bowie (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158. 
151Schelling, The First Outline of a System, 230. 
152F.W.J. Schelling, On University Studies, trans. E. S. Morgan 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1965), 132. 
153F.W.J. Schelling, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory, trans. 
Thomas Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 
217. 




Oken, lay in a chaotic yet stabilizing tension.154 Furthermore, 
“The earth is the corporeal gravity, the substance as a perfectly 
simple position without emergence out of itself, the 0, the 
terrestrial monad.”155 Oken’s failure in articulating the earth as 
a dark heavy zero (despite its genesis in crystallization) is in 
stating that it is only earth at its center. The complex 
immanence of the earth rests neither only at the core nor only 
on the surface. Deleuze and Guattari understand this when 
they write: “The earth is not one element among others but 
rather brings together all the elements within a single 
embrace.”156 
 This geological immanence occurs at various depths. For 
Negarestani, oil, as a geopolitical lubricant, is the rotten 
corpse of the sun157 that helps fuel the insurgency against the 
solar empire. This lubricant works with the ( )hole complex of 
the Earth as the first few components of the rotting earth move 
against the blazing star. This “degenerate wholeness” oscillates 
“between surface and depth—within solid matrices, 
fundamentally corrupting the latter’s consolidation and 
wholeness through perforations and terminal porosities.”158 
This ungrounded earth is, in a naturephilosophy without 
bodies, somewhat less peculiar. Engaging Land again: “Bodies 
are not volumes but coastlines; irresolvable but undelimitable 
penetrabilities, opportunities for the real decomposition of 
space.”159 And simply put, “Void excludes solidity, but solidity 
does not exclude void.”160 
 In its most triumphant moments of assault, the Earth 
(along with nature’s most terrible invention, thought) vomits 
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demons, pollutant clouds, and solar grubbing organisms as 
forced participation in, yet also secret resentment for, the Sun. 
Since the Earth cannot escape the Sun’s orbit, it can only 
mutilate itself in the guise of cooperation. Pace Deleuze and 
Guattari, the Earth cannot merely swing between territory and 
non-territory—such swinging says nothing about its molten 
insider. Negarestani digs deeply on this point: 
Tellurian Insurgency does not merely run on oil 
and dust: A substantial part of it works with 
Cthellium and feeds on metal. The core (Cthelll), as 
a protrusive xenochemical insider, tries to induce 
violent anomalies in the Earth’s body.161 
But let us not forget that bodies themselves are completely 
envoided, swirlings of matter and forces, and, in a 
philosophical sense, messes of onto-epistemological indis-
tinction. In terms of Schellingian transcendental geophilo-
sophy, the transcendental is the surface and not the depths.162 
But if the transcendental is what makes the ideal into the real, 
it is not because the ideal has ontological priority but because 
our grasp of immanence is ideal since it never stops moving. 
The first force of nature would be endlessly productive if not 
for a second negative process.163 
 Earth as a storm of forces, as a darkly productive 
monster, seems far removed from the Earth discussed in 
ecology studies and in popular culture, where it is caught 
between a thing to be worshiped and a thing to be exploited, 
or as Pierre Hadot puts it, between the Orphic and the 
Promethean. The Earth is caught in a torrent of irreversible 
sludge as if all the pollution machines of all the Captain Planet 
villains were unleashed simultaneously and without end. The 
161Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 162. 
162Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 205. 
163See Iain Hamilton Grant, “Introduction to Schelling’s On the 
World Soul,” COLLAPSE VI: Geo/Philosophy (January 2010): 58–95. 




irreversibility of this collapse, of this rotten-ness, is typically 
highly resisted. 
 It is a surprise that even in a cultural cloud as dark as 
that of Black Metal, the fantasy of complete ecological reversal 
remains. The central issue of Black Metal’s inhumanity (or 
perhaps, the voiding of humanity proper) is the questionable 
place from which that void-loving misanthropy emerges, the 
core from which the disintegration of the human is loosed. 
Ecological Black Metal, such as that of the band Wolves in the 
Throne Room, indirectly highlights this problematic by 
narrowing the blackening of BM to target post-industrial 
inhumanity—positing a neo-pagan or otherwise earthly 
human as the proper inhuman subject to replace the 
contemporary capitalism-drenched being (a clear appeal to the 
Orphic tendency of thinking nature). 
 Such actions not only become increasingly 
indistinguishable from naive attempts at green thinking and 
ethics, but also require a presentation of the Earth as ordinary 
arche as well as a retention of the possibility of a miraculous 
reversibility of capitalist energetics—in the possibility of a 
purely earthly (non-artificial) production and form of life. The 
earth is always self-exteriorizing from our conceptions of it, 
via dramatic exteriorization (cosmological expansion) or via a 
horrifying deepening of its interiority (through the microbe, 
the viroid, and so forth), but this is ignored by Wolves in the 
Throne Room’s project of setting out to “purify Black Metal” 
tout court in order to mirror their ecological view—stipulating 
not creation in the void of planetary destruction but a pre-
Oedipal dream-harmony with nature.  
 It is with this invocation of Oedipus that we move to the 
great solar mother. 
 
 
5.2. BLACK SUN 
 
We see at a glance wide seas of fire, raising their 
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flames towards the heavens, frantic storms, whose 
fury doubles the intensity of the burning seas, while 
they themselves make the fiery seas overflow their 
banks, sometimes covering the higher regions of 
this world body, sometimes allowing them to sink 
back down within their borders. Burned out rocks 
extend their frightening peaks up above the flaming 
chasms. 
Kant 
The sun is a whore. 
Daniel Schreber 
Kant wants the sun to be a planet, badly. Hoping that the sun 
has an atmosphere of its own,164 Kant praises the force of the 
sun, but this is only because he cannot stand the sun’s 
distance. The philosopher’s problem is that he wants to be the 
sun. At least Zarathustra is honest about it: “Thus spoke 
Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and strong, like a 
morning sun emerging from behind dark mountains.”165 Judge 
Schreber took it a step further with the concept of the solar 
replenishment of his insides,166 which allowed him to exist 
without organs, to be made only of sunbeams.167 Deleuze and 
Guattari see this as a positive condition—Schreber’s ability to 
attract sunbeams with his slippery body.168 
164Kant, Immanuel, Universal Natural History and Theory of the 
Heavens, trans. Ian Johnston (Arlington: Richer Resources Publi-
cations, 2008), 107–108. 
165Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 336. 
166Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 2. 
167Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 8. 
168Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 15. 






 This is also the driving horror of Danny Boyle’s Sunshine. 
In the film, a vessel is sent to the sun with a massive nuclear 
warhead in order to reignite the solar core. On the way, the 
crew experiences various problems—one goes sun-mad and 
spends more and more time in the viewing room, transfixed 
by the rage of the sun, before eventually allowing himself to be 
cooked alive. Another, while attempting to repair the sun, is 
overwhelmed by the cascading light of the sun and is killed. 
The crew eventually picks up a distress signal from the first 
ship, Icarus I, that attempted this mission, and they go aboard 
for repair materials. They soon learn that the captain of the 
first ship went sun-mad and, as a scorched piece of meat, he 
begins killing the remaining characters. True to the ship’s 
name, the vessel is unable to withstand proximity to the sun, 
and it sacrifices itself in order to restart the sun, destroying the 
survivors in a blaze. 
 The sun is a destructive monster, yet its productive 
capacity cannot be overestimated. For Schelling, it is the 
chemical synthesizer of the earth,169 as well as the imperfect 
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hearth of the world that wishes to consume the earth.170 
Schelling describes the sun as a dynamic trigger this way: 
“External nature and earth would remain cold, dark, and 
completely secluded and devoid of creativity if they were not 
opposed by the effect of the sun.”171 
 For Oken, it is also a strange gelatinous animal, an 
important creature in a totally organic cosmos.172 For 
Negarestani, the sun is both vitalist and annihilationist in its 
empire over the earth.173 What is required is a perverse 
immanent meld of the earth and the sun.174 Furthermore, this 
sun-earth axis is the producer of hell from the black egg of the 
earth.175 
 Again it is tempting to return to Land and his pseudo-
Bataillean naturephilosophy. The sun must be the illuminator 
for Plato and Socrates.176 But there is, for Bataille, a second 
sun, a dark sun, a black sun:177 “The sensations we drink from 
the black sun afflict us as ruinous passion, skewering our 
senses upon the drive to waste ourselves.”178 
 There are strange dreams about surviving this aspect of 
the sun, which culminates in the cataclysm of its destruction 
preceded by its darkening, its blackening, and its degradation 
towards meltdown. In the closing pages of Nihil Unbound, 
Brassier writes: 
Everything is dead already. Solar death is cata-
strophic because it vitiates ontological temporality 
as configured in terms of philosophical ques-
170Schelling, Bruno, 175. 
171Schelling, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory, 211. 
172Oken, Elements of Physiophilosophy, 70. 
173Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 92. 
174Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 147. 
175Negarestani, Cyclonopedia, 147. 
176Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 28. 
177Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 29. 
178Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, 29. 




tioning’s constitutive horizonal relationship to the 
future. But far from lying in wait for us in the far 
distant future, on the other side of the terrestrial 
horizon, the solar catastrophe needs to be grasped 
as something that has already happened; as the 
aboriginal trauma driving the history of terrestrial 
life as an elaborately circuitous detour from stellar 
death.179 
 
Two twisted conclusions resulting from this are an attempt to 
outlive the solar withering and the possibility of a dead and 
black sun. In the first instance, there is no better example than 
the work of William Hope Hodgson, and in particular Night 
Land and The House on the Borderland.180 In the former, 
humanity cowers in a gigantic metal pyramid, watching the 
world mutate under the faded light of an extinct sun, whereas 
in the latter, the protagonist watches the universe and 
everything around him decay due to the ravages of time. In the 
second instance, we have the long cultic use of the black sun. 
 Goodrick-Clarke’s text Black Sun provides a litany of 
interpretations of this occult phenomenon—from the 
alchemical sol niger as the first stage of creation, to Horbiger’s 
black sun as a dark earth capturing planets, to Wiligut’s black 
sun as an extinct star orbiting the earth, and finally to the 
black sun as the Babylonian inner light.181 All the black suns 
form a vomitous circle of matter with the earth. 
 The figure of the black sun allows the earth to break out 
                                                                                  
179Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 223. 
180William Hope Hodgson, The Night Land (1912), Wikisource: http: 
//en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Night_Land, and The House on the 
Borderland (1908): http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_House_on_ the 
_Borderland. 
181Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric 
Nazism, and the Politics of Identity (New York: New York University 
Press, 2003), 131, 132, 147. 
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of its slavery, out of its baked mass, striking toward the sun or 
breaking away from it, before it boils the oceans away and kills 
all life on the planet. A black sun is the hope that the sun will 
rot and fall into the earth, and the dark earth is the wish that 
the planet will rocket, like a perforating monad, towards the 
sun—this is the dream of destroying it. 
 
 





And now at last the Earth was dead. The final pitiful 
survivor had perished. All the teeming billions; the 
slow aeons; the empires and civilizations of man-
kind were summed up in this poor twisted form—
and how titanically meaningless it had all been! 
Now indeed had come an end and climax to all the 
efforts of humanity—how monstrous and incred-
ible a climax in the eyes of those poor complacent 
fools in the prosperous days! Not ever again would 
the planet know the thunderous tramping of 
human millions—or even the crawling of lizards 
and the buzz of insects, for they, too, had gone. 
Now was come the reign of sapless branches and 
endless fields of tough grasses. Earth, like its cold, 
imperturbable moon, was given over to silence and 
blackness forever. The stars whirled on; the whole 
careless plan would continue for infinities 
unknown. This trivial end of a negligible episode 
mattered not to distant nebulae or to suns new-
born, flourishing, and dying. The race of man, too 
puny and momentary to have a real function or 
purpose, was as if it had never existed. To such a 
conclusion the aeons of its farcically toilsome 
evolution had led.  
H.P. Lovecraft, Till A’ the Seas 
 
94 nihilismus autodidactus 
We were too many. Such statements precede the evacuation of 
the earth due to overpopulation, a possibility all too possible, 
given the ongoing slumifiction and slime-ification of the 
capitalized earth. 
 There will be a great lesson in nihil: solar system after 
solar system will be found devoid of life. Sending von 
Neumann probes out into the void searching for the trace of 
life or even habitability will result in failures. That is, of 
course, if we can first escape not only the terrestrial but also 
the terrestrial as confining thought and life, as choosing a 
mode of living, of being unable to escape the storm of 
capitalist currents moving on the earth. In other words, we 
will only know that we are too many if we stop living as 
consumers. 
 One of the most unfortunate constants of science fiction 
is its humanistic optimism, whether secular or mythic. The 
unification of planets, of empires, and rebellions asserts a 
communitarian harmony as well as a ubiquity of civilized life. 
The post-apocalyptic and the dying earth subgenres offer some 
hope of desolation and pessimism but often relapse into 
pointless optimism. Leaving the Earth and the Sun behind 
means being open to the cosmos, beyond the possibility of 
being baked by the red and bloated sun as in Lovecraft’s “Till 
A’ the Seas,” quoted above.182 This openness does not inspire 
optimism, only dejection. 
 Beyond the nihilism of Michel Houellebecq’s The 
Possibility of an Island,183 where humanity’s replacement 
functions plant-like under the sun, the sun must be left 
behind. The end of the solar economy opens the energetic 
economy toward total extinction. Extinction beyond the solar. 
Films like Pandorum and TV series such as Battlestar 
Galactica leave behind the sun, but all, unfortunately, find a 
182H.P. Lovecraft, “Till A’ the Seas,” The H.P. Lovecraft Archive: http:// 
www.hplovecraft.com/writings/fiction/tas.aspx.
183Michel Houellebecq, The Possibility of an Island, trans. Gavin Bowd 
(New York: Vintage, 2005).




home again. We must face the possibility that we will lose all 
sense of at-homeness. 
 We must cultivate a search for a new earth that ends in 
repeated failure, but in a sense that does not re-trans-
cendentalize the original earth. Where the distress call leads to 
dead and empty vessels, where signs of life turn out to be no 
more than deadly microbes. A tale that ends only in the 
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